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Introduction 
 
In Katherine Dunn’s novel, Geek Love, the freaks do not hide. Geeks are sideshow 
performers who are the result of human interest in the manipulation of bodies. Often, the entire 
act would consist of a person eating the head off of an animal on stage. Her description of 
freakish children growing up in a traveling sideshow places the visceral and bizarre closer to 
nostalgia, and what most would consider a routine outing suddenly become locations for tragedy. 
The opening scene of the novel begins with a children’s story, the small Binewski children ask 
their father to tell them about their mother’s past career as a circus geek. They love this story of 
their mother. They ask for him to retell it again and again:  
There never was such a snap and twist of the wrist, such a vampire flick of the jaws 
over a neck or such a champagne approach to the blood. She’d shake her star white 
hair and the bitten-off chicken head would skew off into the corner while she dug 
her rosy little fingernails in and lifted the flopping, jittering carcass like a golden 
goblet, and sipped! Absolutely sipped at the wriggling guts! She was magnificent, 
a princess, a Cleopatra, an elfin queen! That was your Mama in the geek pit (Dunn 
6). 
Mr. Binewski describes her performances with a repeated juxtaposition between grace and the 
grotesque. While the geek is a circus role usually reserved for the desperate and the deplorable, 
the Binewski family reveres the unusual. They find beauty in asymmetry and grace in savagery. 
The children grow to inherit their father’s fascination with unexpected form as the novel 
progresses. Dunn magnifies the beauty to be found in the freakish human body and the bestial to 
be found in the human. In Sideshow U.S.A.: Freaks and the American Cultural Imagination, 
Rachel Adams explains that freak shows like the fictional Binewski Fabulon “...performed 
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important cultural work by allowing ordinary people to confront, and master, the most extreme 
and terrifying forms of Otherness they could imagine, from exotic dark-skinned people, to 
victims of war and disease, to ambiguously sexed bodies” (2). This study entails acknowledging 
human traits that are otherwise often ignored. The sideshow allows its audience to satiate their 
curiosity of the vast variations of the standard conception of the human body and to expand the 
cultural imagination of what a human can be. 
 Geek Love is packed with freakish bodies either born fantastic, or created by the 
Binewski family themselves through genetic manipulation. Olympia Binewski, the narrator, is an 
albino-hunchback-dwarf born from one of her parents’ experiments with self-selection by having 
the mother consume chemicals and other drugs during gestation in the hopes of creating a 
sideshow freak, interesting enough for a single-act in the family carnival. Alas, Olympia is 
deemed ugly by her family’s standards, but is not freakish enough to have her own show like her 
flipper-limbed brother Arturo, the Aqua Boy, or her twin Siamese sisters Iphy and Elly. And so, 
she must prove her devotion to her family and their Fabulon by finding her own unique talent, 
using her alluring voice to draw in the crowd as an apprentice to her father, the outside barker 
whose role is to attract an audience from the midway into the freak show tent. 
While the Binewski children’s favorite story may be that of their doll-like mother 
dancing in the grit of the geek pit, the family uses language to reorganize their value system for 
physical beauty. As Jack Selzer writes in his introduction to Habeas Corpus, the Binewski 
family believes in the materiality of language, where “Words have been mattering more than 
matter” (4) and the outside barker’s delusive descriptions of the wonder behind the tent becomes 
reality. In Dunn’s novel words like fabulon, amazing, wonder, unusual, and shocking stand in for 
synonyms for perfection rather than oddity. 
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While the freakish acts and bodies Dunn describes may incite disgust, she also recognizes 
the almost universal human wish to change the shape and structure of one’s own body. Whether 
through dress, violence, amputation, or art, Dunn’s novel portrays both the freaks and the 
audience as victims of discomfort in our own bodies and confusion at perceptions of the other. 
Such an extreme treatment of the human body raises a challenge to modern sensibilities. We tell 
our children not to stare, that it is polite to ignore the unusual, that pointing causes pain, but 
Dunn’s novel shows us that all bodies deserve to be acknowledged as human, whatever that may 
mean. 
This thesis is ultimately a study of the question of humanity. How can we further 
understand what it means to be human by focusing our attention on a subset of human beings 
who make their living by displaying their bodies because they appear to be almost inhuman? 
Geek Love welcomes readers to change their perception of the value of an average human 
body—one centered head at the top, a torso, two arms, two legs, mostly symmetrical, five 
fingers, five toes. Instead of exalting this common form, Dunn’s novel addresses how human 
identity is much more flexible than that; human identity can be found in beings with bodies that 
diverge from the instructions of normality. In fact, human beings push against the borders of the 
categories of beings and objects found within the world. The Binewski children's bodies seem 
layered with animal and alien qualities and were created by their father’s performance at a mad 
scientist. Even the audiences in Dunn’s novel eventually want to take part and use both medicine 
and innovation to change their bodies, whether it is to blend with or distinguish themselves from 
the public conception of the average human body. Geek Love is not a sensational book. Instead, 
Dunn writes within a larger ongoing conversation about the impacts of modern technology, 
cybernetics, and the lengthened average lifespan of all humans, due to advanced medical 
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technology. Whereas humans have stared in wonder at freakish, misshapen, and foreign bodies, 
at freak shows in the past, the freak show has moved from the traveling carnival or installations 
like Barnum’s American Museum in New York to the hospital, to the genetic laboratory, to the 
Internet, and through the skies as streaming messages from our mobile phones. Today, humans 
all over the world partake in cosmetic surgeries or enjoy sending photographic messages of 
themselves manipulated, turned into animals using SnapChat’s puppy filter. Facebook Spaces 
allow humans to meet and communicate in virtual settings as animated avatars accessible 
through virtual reality headsets. Humans are now used to seeing their own image manipulated by 
filters and mixed reality technologies. The human conception of human identity is expanding as 
these technologies advance. By understanding further what inhuman aspects the freakish body 
displays in order to be called “freakish,” we can touch upon the borders that differentiate the 
human from the animal, he machine, or the object and see that these borders may not fully 
contain the human at all. 
Dunn’s exploration of the human perception of freakish bodies should be studied in the 
context of posthumanism, which requires to give the body a more crucial role as the vehicle for 
perception of the spaces through which it moves. Particularly, I am writing to join the posthuman 
conversation to Dunn’s work using ideas primarily originating from thinkers who were 
influential to modern posthuman studies: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but also Giorgio Agamben, 
Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida as well as thinkers like Carey Wolfe, Katherine Hayes, 
and Donna Harroway who are actively engaged in the posthuman discussion and have taken the 
chance to distinguish posthuman thought from other forms of literary criticism. Part of this thesis 
also includes information from historians who have focused on the role of the sideshow freak in 
the nineteenth to twentieth century American culture. In his book, What is Posthumanism, Cary 
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Wolfe defines the movement as “a historical moment in which the decentering of the human by 
its imbrication in technical, medical, informatics, and economic networks is increasingly 
impossible to ignore” (15). Posthumanism acknowledges the human body as a transformative 
mixed media, which can contain and become permeated with what would be considered 
traditionally inhuman qualities.  
Hayes researches the history of a growing technology, cybernetics, to see how the human 
body and mind is adapting and changing alongside our technology, while Agamben searches to 
“explore ontologies that allow for the fraternal and non-hierarchical coexistence of all forms of 
life” including animals (Seri 1). Wolfe’s description of posthumanism differentiates itself from 
other forms of literary criticism that traditionally assumes that humanity is a separate, definable 
existence separate from other dimensions of life and the world. Instead, the modern human is 
also a combination of man-made objects and ideas and can be understood by thinking about all 
things previously considered inhuman. We only have to look at the vast amount of personal 
information that exists on a single mobile device to see how that device has become an extension 
of the owner’s identity and body. But technology is only a piece of what posthumanism 
maintains affects the human body. The animal, the object, and the other dynamic layers of the 
world around us are also due consideration. 
While Dunn creates characters who were purposefully created to have freakish bodies, 
history thrives with famous and infamous freaks who were born with their deformities. These 
freaks inspired Dunn’s work as well as the modern fascination with the almost extinct freak 
show. Best sellers like Water for Elephants and The Night Circus have reintroduced the carnival 
and circus as popular settings for mystery and magic while the widely watched television series 
American Horror Story cast freak show as a place of terror. The reemergence of the freak show 
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as a setting of public interest owes tribute to historical freaks like Ella Harper, who was born in 
1873 and toured the U.S. for four years as “The Camel Girl…pronounced by scientists the most 
wonderful freak of nature ever seen since the creation of the world, a beautiful young lady with 
the classic features of a woman but the body of a camel” (Hartzman 45). While one might picture 
a hairy, quadruped body with hooves and a tail, one or two humps, a long neck, and a doll-like 
face, Ella Harper was a normal girl, but for her knees. They were inverted, bending behind her 
instead of in front, and she would often walk on all fours as a result. Her freak show debut is 
cataloged in Hartzman’s collection of professional freaks, American Sideshow: An Encyclopedia 
of History’s Most Wondrous and Curiously Strange Performers. The historical treatment of 
Camel Girl and other animal hybrids like her, shows a reemergence of interest in freak shows 
prevalent in the eighteen to nineteen hundreds. While the mind may notice similarities to already 
known objects, especially through suggestion, modern audiences reading Hartzman’s book or 
searching historical freaks online more clearly recognize people like Ella as human. Onlookers to 
Ella’s show in Tennessee or Kentucky in the twentieth century would have noted the inward turn 
of her legs like that in the spindled legs of a camel, a foreign animal, of which, they may have 
never seen anywhere besides an encyclopedia. Without the constant whirl of foreign images 
pervaded by film and the internet, past generations were more likely to take outside barkers—the 
announcers meant to draw in the crowds—at their word. 
While asking the question whether or not Ella Harper, while playing her role as The 
Camel Girl, became any closer to becoming a camel, one finds his or herself asking a question of 
a posthumanist kind. Did she deserve her nickname? Surely, with the suggestion of the 
advertisements and the barker, and the spatial influence, the audience would know that they are 
intended to notice the similarity between the bend of Ella’s legs and a camel’s. Likewise, in 
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Katherine Dunn’s novel, the narrator’s brother, Arturo, is billed as Aqua Boy and his limbs are 
consistently referred to as “flippers”. His parents recognize his potential to be a seal-like act, and 
“He was taught to swim in infancy and was displayed nude in a big clear-sided tank like an 
aquarium” (8). After these prepubescent displays of his body, Arturo finds that his act is much 
more interesting if the audience finds him in a tank of water and this set up seems to attract and 
create enthusiastic returning fans as “The bright tank in the dim tent was a focus. The water and 
his floating form were soothing, hypnotic. People stared at the tank and his undulating figure as 
they would a bright fire” (50). The fact that Ella was physically separated from the inside a tent, 
on a stage, or that Arturo literally has a glass wall between himself and his audience highlights 
their physical differences from the audience before them. Olympia, the narrator of Dunn’s novel 
explains that “The tank made him exotic but safe” (50). The freak is viewable but will not touch 
the audience, a fear that could arise from the threat of attack or contagion. Ultimately, the final 
threat that the freak presents is the threat of becoming less human, of missing crucial aspects of 
the body, of death. 
The main ideas that this thesis explores are highlighted in the example of Ella Harper and 
Arturo Binewski. As we analyze the phenomenology of professional freaks, they change the way 
we think of humans interacting within spaces. They also change how we perceive a human body 
in relation to animals and machines, and they ultimately remind the audience of the one aspect of 
life that connects all things—death. Chapter one of this thesis, Torture Acts: Inclusion and 
Exclusion in Katherine Dunn’s Geek Love, delves into the alignment of social and physical 
spaces through which freakish bodies exist and disappear, where they are safe and where they are 
in danger. Chapter two, “The Bestial Body/Cyborg/Enhanced Body” addresses how the freakish 
body dwells near the borders of the divinations between humans and other beings of the world—
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animals and machines. Chapter three, “Death and Identity: Probing the Extremes” deals with the 
most natural event that impacts the lives of all mortal beings and objects—death. All of these 
discussions use Dunn’s freaks as primary examples to analyze the extent to which the definition 
of humanity can be stretched to cover not only disfigured human bodies, but also to take notice 
of the human relationship to the other living and non-living pieces of the world which a usually 
forgotten during reflection on the reach of humanity. Humans share an embodied existence with 
almost every other being of the world. By taking note of human bodies that are unusual, we can 
perceive more commonalities between humans and all other beings and objects that share the 
same world. 
Discussing spaces of safety and of violence, where freaks are able to be included or are 
excluded are crucial to understanding the question of the ways that humans organize themselves 
to animals. Keeping an animal requires cages, fences, and containers so they do not escape the 
space in which they are meant to be. Sideshows were also often associated with circuses, and 
freak show tents may even be placed within the menagerie of caged lions, bears, and camels 
leading to the big top. In this formation, the audience would have become accustomed to the 
physical separation of animal and freak as they would walk from spectacle to spectacle. 
However, the construction of the physical space of the sideshow, or the suggestion of the 
carnival outside barker are not the only reasons that displayed freaks have been compared to and 
treated like animals. Merleau-Ponty’s thinking reappears here along with the writing of Giorgio 
Agamben. Both have set the precedent that the bodily human existence calls on us to question 
why we perceive living things in animal and human categories and further, asks us to reevaluate 
our reasoning for this separation. In What is Posthumanism Cary Wolfe asks posthuman critics in 
animal-studies to take a Foucault-inspired approach to analyze the animal by questioning the 
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methodologies and theories of thinkers who have delved into animal-studies and the social 
systems that have caused people to believe they ride the line between animal and human (108-
109). In other words, the posthuman approach to the question of what separates the human from 
the animal, requires a researcher who does not take it for granted that they are the human 
standard, or that they cannot be called animal as well. 
The reemergence of interest in the human-animal hybrid parallels the popular concern of 
prosthesis technology, which allows amputees to run faster climb farther, and sense more 
intensely. In part two, I further explore this posthuman interest in the enhanced human and the 
creation of the cyborg where machine, technology, and the object converge with the flesh to 
create new enhanced creatures to rival the human and the animal. The cyborg body studied here 
includes analysis into the necessary Binewski style of play at genetics and physical manipulation. 
In Dunn’s novel, it becomes clear that the Binewski parents treasure all of their creations, those 
that were able to live and those that died shortly after birth. All of their children are tantalizing 
precursors of the next kind of human, precursors to the cyborg. 
Dunn’s novel and her characters live in the shadow of death as they constantly must find 
spaces of safety and prove themselves to have the same rights as other average-bodied humans. 
The freak show itself features both living and non-living bodies as Lillian Binewski preserves 
her failed experiments, the children who did not live, in “the Chute,” a museum of dead bodies 
(54). The audience of the Binewski Fabulon is implicated in this chapter as well as the freakish 
body proves to engage with what Kolnai calls a human “intention towards death” (75). The 
previous chapters both lead to a discussion of not just death of the body but also of the human 
identity as Dunn’s novel allows the reader multiple access points to understand her freaks as 
humans, but humans who also share traits with animals, machines, and immobile objects. 
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Many reviewers have called Dunn’s work a grotesque. They either write it off as a 
gruesome, cheap thrill, or acknowledge its repulsiveness as an unfortunate side effect of her 
failed goal—representing the humanity of the freak. But the human existence is an embodied 
one, no matter how misshapen. Embodied existence makes the human visible and solitary, a 
capsule charged with specific traits which we have come to define as human. In Sideshow U.S.A. 
Adams reminds us that culture’s perception of the freakish body has changed over time; 
“Whereas once human prodigies were treated as the bearers of divine meaning, by the nineteenth 
century freaks had no inherent significance, although their anomalies seemed to cry out for 
interpretation” (5). As sideshow performers, freaks satisfy this need by marketing themselves as 
spectacles. They imagine creation stories for themselves that make their disfigurement easier to 
believe for the audience. They tell their audience there was a freak accident or that they have 
traveled from an exotic place. By requesting these creation stories the audience denies that the 
freak is fully human, but by looking at these interactions more closely we can see how freak 
shows reveal humanity at the edge of distinction between other categories of life and bound 
toward the posthuman. 
All in all, Merleau-Ponty and the later writings of Foucault lead to a posthuman wonder 
in the use and necessity of the human body in an increasingly virtual world. Wolfe explains that 
posthumanism is a call to forgo “our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, including 
the normal perceptual modes and affective states of Homosapiens itself, by recontextualizing 
them in terms of the entire sensorium of other living beings,” things, and spaces (25). This 
sensorium may sound magical, eerie, a frontier of fully animated bodies where before stood a 
quiet room. In Geek Love, Dunn places us inside this sensorium and the active stages of the freak 
show, where all eyes are on the body and all bodies are game for consideration. Dunn’s extreme 
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representations of embodied experience foreground the body’s role in creating the divide 
between the norm and the freak. By looking deeper into Dunn’s novel, we can find traits of 
humanity throughout the sensorium and come to realize that humanity overlaps with animals, 
machines, and objects. In fact, humans search to incorporate the benefits of the animal and the 
object into themselves as technology advances. Perhaps, it is only by accepting that humanity 
uses and is highly related to other creatures and things, will we be able to continue to thrive 
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Torture Acts: Inclusion and Exclusion in Katherine Dunn’s Geek Love 
The presentation of freakish bodies in carnivals and sideshows used to be quite common 
but began to disappear as medicinal science found names and causes for many of the performers’ 
conditions. Audiences have experienced guilt and discomfort at viewing individuals who could 
now be considered handicapped or exploited by show managers. The movement of the freakish 
body from performative stages to disguised, hidden states within communal space takes a similar 
course to thinker Michel Foucault’s study of how punishment moved its focus away from the 
body to the mind—or soul—in the “non-corporal system” of the shadow box prison (16). In 
Geek Love, the freakish body is transferred back onto a public stage, portraying bodies that are 
bestial, surgically altered and preserved. Dunn pushes her characters and their bodies to their 
extremes until they are almost unrecognizable as human, testing for the fragile stitching where 
the freakish body is allowed to be observed and where it should be hidden. In doing so, she 
explores the spaces of inclusion and exclusion of the freakish body, which pushes the boundaries 
of social acceptance and pushes freakish bodies into the realm of isolation. Dunn’s novel resists 
the modern American cry for the polite protection of the disfigured that ultimately leads them to 
seclusion. Although her frank and unrelenting writing makes readers uncomfortable, by keeping 
the tortured body centered, in visceral detail, Dunn reveals hidden social systems through which 
the body is punished today.  
This punishment echoes the works of Michel Foucault, whose idea is important for the 
analysis of Geek Love. But before Foucault wrote about the panopticon of the prison, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty wrote Phenomenology of Perception, first published in 1945, and discusses many 
ideas of the body and its crucial role in human experience eventually used by posthumanism. He 
advocates for the body as a prerequisite for a conscious understanding of the self, soul, and true 
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method for interacting with the world. He asks, “Can I not find in the body some threads that the 
internal organs send to the brain and that are instituted by nature in order to give the soul the 
opportunity to sense its body?” (78). For Merleau-Ponty, we must search for this method of 
perception that takes the body into consciousness, an introspection of the physical. Otherwise, 
we are doomed to an existence where “Consciousness of the body and of the soul are thereby 
repressed, and the body again becomes that highly polished machine that the ambiguous notion 
of behavior had almost made us forget” (78). Ultimately inspiring Michel Foucault, who 
eventually popularized embodiment, Merleau-Ponty’s writing is crucial as we understand how 
the bodily experience, especially the estranged experience within a freakish body like those of 
Dunn’s characters, tell us more about humanity as they move through the world. 
Foucault agrees with Merleau-Ponty that the body is a crucial role-player a determined 
consciousness of life and self. Rather than focusing on the body as the perceiver, Foucault is 
interested in the ways the body has been used as a subject to be perceived. Part one of Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison is called “Torture” and is broken into 
two chapters, “The Body of the Condemned” and “The Spectacle of the Scaffold.” In his 
introduction Foucault recounts a particularly violent public execution of an individual who is 
burned, torn apart with metal forceps, drawn and quartered, and then burned again. He doesn’t 
leave out the excruciating details of how the executioner struggled to rip apart the strips of skin 
and muscle or how the horses were not strong enough to quarter the body and the executioners 
had to saw the limbs to start them off (3-4).  
Foucault places this vivid example in the forefront of his reader’s mind and then traces 
the history of the movement from public execution and torture to the impenetrable modern prison 
system where punishment is blocked from the public eye and operates separate from it. Public 
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punishment was deemed to be grotesque, offensive, and a social recreation of the criminal’s 
crimes. And so, once moved to the shadow box of the prison, punishment became “a less 
immediately physical kind” (8) that shifted its focus from the body and “physical pain” (8) to an 
amorphous idea that uses the body as an “instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to 
imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded 
both as a right and as property” (4-9). For Foucault, there is also a tremendous, if not equal, 
horror in moving punishment away from the body to the mind—or soul—in this new “non-
corporal system” (16).  
While Mrs. and Mr. Binewski have no physical deformities of their own, their children 
cannot easily hide their unique bodies in public. Even though Olympia does disguise herself in 
public life as a grown woman with a hat, glasses, and “goat wig” (12) she still gets stares from 
passersby on her daily route to work. In Merleau Ponty’s introduction of Phenomenology of 
Perception, he acknowledges the limits of embodied perception and how he “can see one object 
insofar as objects form a system or a world, and insofar as each of them arranges the others 
around itself like spectators of its hidden aspects and as the guarantee of their permanence” (71). 
Because we live in a multi-dimensional world, we can only notice sides of objects, the outer 
shells and angles of passersby on the street. Understanding that there is more to perceive than 
what a single gaze allows helps to create the world in association with other passersby in the 
same plane. Although only part of Olympia can be perceived and although she covers most of 
her body while in public, her physical difference is still unmistakable. Bestial bodies are so 
misshapen from the normal human body that they are at once noticeable; they meet a threshold 
of change in shape that causes onlookers to gawk and disrupts passersby in action.  
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Roger Lund explores the possible causes of the human disassociation from dwarfs, 
hunchbacks, and persons with physical deformities. He looks mostly at writings by authors and 
poets during the eighteenth century, which he calls a “callous” (92) age where mockery of the 
deformed was very common by persons of all classes and associations. Lund argues that 
deformed persons were considered inhuman during this time period because their bodies do not 
follow the argument of design, which dictates that nature “display[s] a visible and unmistakable 
beauty and order” (94). Because deformed bodies are often not symmetrical, they cause a 
disturbance in the observer’s view of nature and stand out annoyingly like a warp in a glass or a 
wrinkle in a shirt (94-95). The difference between a bestial body and a normal one, is that the 
shape is distorted enough to cause a repeated experience of disturbance. 
Thus, Olympia describes the stare of the passerby as the “ice moment” (14) where the 
observer notices the freak, pauses, and is immediately ashamed at having done so. A similar 
experience happens when an observer passes a beggar. Eyes are diverted, and a sense of guilt is 
felt. However, the passerby feels guilt at the beggar for not donating money or offering any help, 
while the passerby of the freak feels guilt for noticing their existence in the first place, the fact 
that they are different from other unobtrusive bodies around them. This noticing is not a 
conscious mental act; instead, the experience is much like Taylor Carmen’s description in the 
forward of Phenomenology of Perception, it derives from “skillful bodily responsiveness and 
spontaneity in direct engagement with the world” (5). Somehow, the recognition of freakish 
bodies is highly attached to the normal plane of perception stationed by the structure of the body 
norm. Olympia is a dwarf, and because of this bodily deformity, her movement exists on a lower 
plane than that of most other passersby. In the same way that one might notice the swift 
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movement of a mouse scurrying across the floor from the periphery, Olympia’s stature attracts 
attention with her isolated intersection across the bottom of the normative plane of sight.  
In Olympia’s description of this occurrence, thawing out of the ice moment involves 
sharing the experience with others and coming up with a reason for the interruption. They ask, 
where did these freaks come from? Olympia imagines they suppose her and her mother “are 
residents of an institutional halfway house, or that the circus is in town. (14)” Here, Olympia 
strikes upon two spaces in which the bestial body is expected to be found. The ice moment does 
not occur under settings where the bestial body is meant to be the primary focus. In what 
Merleau Ponty calls the “object-horizon structure” or perspective, Olympia’s body uses this 
structure as a means to recede into the background or unveil herself into the foreground (70). In 
the introduction to Phenomenology of Perception Donald Landes notes “the movements of the 
body or the apparent sizes of objects do not cause the structures of the visual field, but they 
motivate them” (39). Olympia’s difference in size and shape motivates her unveil. Because of 
her freakish body, she has less control of where and when she moves between the hidden and 
active lines of sight. In either case, because her figure is highly unique from those around her, 
she is ultimately isolated everywhere, whether she hides in the shadows or when she is drawn 
into the light.  
Lund notices that the 18th century public culture was less guilty about laughing at 
physical deformity and traveling sideshows, which were much more popular than they are today. 
Dwarves, giants, bearded ladies, Siamese twins, the armless, and the limbless found wealth and 
security in displaying their unique bodies. Branded as anatomical wonders and dressed for high-
class society, these freaks found employment where otherwise, they would not be able to. As 
medicine advanced throughout the 20th century, doctors found causes for the conditions of 
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famous freaks like the pinheads or people with large growths or missing digits. Instead of 
marvels, freaks were more rightly deemed patients. And this understanding allowed for less 
bestial bodies to be born with advances in prenatal care. The sideshows all but disappeared as 
they offended the public’s collective sentimentality. Rachel Adams opens Sideshow U.S.A.: 
Freaks and the American Cultural Imagination by arguing that even “During the period of their 
decline, [sideshows] maintained a firm hold on the imaginations of many Americans who had 
visited them in better days. This imaginative afterlife gave rise to a certain paradox: as actual 
freak shows were evicted from culture, their representational currency multiplied, granting them 
symbolic importance” (2). Adams describes this afterlife as a world where the average person 
yearns to see the spectacular, the bally line, the freaks on stage. Cultural memory of the 
sideshows spikes curiosity, but shows themselves are gone and the proper space in which the 
masses are allowed to stare has been stripped away. 
In Dunn’s novel, the freaks live during this time after the sideshows were no longer 
actively traveling across the country. The deformed are primarily civilians rather than performers 
and the average person does not see the bestial in public or daily life. The Binewski family lives 
normally within the confines of their trailer (the domestic home) or the sideshow (the stage). One 
day, when Mrs. Binewski tells her children that they will all go out to the store together, the 
eldest, Arty, asks her “Do you think it’s a good idea if we all go” (56)? He then makes a point to 
choose his wheelchair rather than the rubber pads for his belly that he uses to slither across the 
ground and clarifies, “It’s easier in public” (57). Arty knows he can’t use the mode of 
transportation that he prefers in his domestic life, because it will never have been seen before by 
the inhabitants of the outside word. His small comment foreshadows the extreme reaction from 
the social world. Dunn does not just re-invoke the ice moment, instead, one of the most 
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commonplace public spaces—the store—becomes the most dangerous place for the freak 
children. As they get out of the family van, they are seen by another man in the parking lot who, 
horrified by the site of the creatures filing from the vehicle, grabs his gun and opens fire, trying 
to kill them all (58-59).  
There is blood and smoke, tears, a mother begs for her children’s safety, all narrated by 
Olympia when she was only six years old. The drastic change between spaces of safety and 
danger, of living and trespassing are immediately made apparent by the extremity of the 
situation. In this scene, Arturo, who chooses to publicize himself as being a combination of man 
and seal, morphs further into this hybridity as he senses the danger before it happens and is 
ultimately hunted like animals are. In What is Posthumanism, Wolfe acknowledges the 
posthuman interest in the human-animal relationship and argues that “we can no longer talk of 
the body or even, for that matter, of a body in the traditional sense” any longer (23). Dunn 
exaggerates this hybridity as the children are instantly mourned as both children and the hunted, 
freaks, and an endangered species. Though Dunn is not directly exploring the notion of 
posthumanism, this work could be important posthuman analysis as scenes like the parking lot 
shooting show how the freakish body’s movement through space changes characters from a 
human family to desperate animals. As the spaces become more dangerous, the characters morph 
from their confident personas as super-humans to sub-human prey. 
As an adult, Olympia travels the city alone, in semi-disguise, moving as quickly and 
quietly as possible. She spends time only at her work as a radio personality, where her body is 
invisible, and her home where she is solitary. While she grew up in the carnival she could reveal 
herself freely, living within community of her family. There, her bodily presence was wanted 
and fit the pattern of randomness that a freak show provides. If Olympia and her brothers and 
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sisters were to stand in a line up, the eyes focusing on them would move erratically across their 
drastically disparate heights, sizes, colors, and shapes. Within the randomness, Olympia could 
live in the background. Inside the city, she must actively work to change her appearance to go 
unseen.  
In How We Became Posthuman, Katherine Hayles writes of the conflicting experience of 
the “embodied” and “weightless” human experience, where individuals are familiar to their 
temporal and physical existence as well as a transcendent one “made possible in part by the near-
instantaneous transfer of information from one point on the globe to any other” (394). She is 
wary of the trend to consider the weightless experience superior for its sense of freedom, 
unbound by time, space, and pain, and forewarns doe-eyed thinkers, arguing that there is an 
influential human “connection with direct sensory experience” (395) that would be lost in a 
completely unembodied existence. But as a radio voice, Olympia does this daily. She uses 
technology to assert her presence and spirit dissociated from her body. However, the physical 
world and city that she is a part of continues to exist outside of the radio studio. Each time she 
leaves the studio, her body rematerializes, only to wish she could hide herself again. Although 
Olympia is able to live, if only during working hours, as a bodiless voice, as information flowing 
though waves from the station’s tower, what she really needs, is to find a space when she can 
exist in safety, rather than a new medium through which to exist. 
One night, as she often would, Olympia secretly follows her daughter, Miranda, who is 
completely unaware of her heritage or her mother’s existence. This night, she goes to a strip club 
where Miranda works as a dancer. The club specializes in women with small deformities that are 
fetishized, like Miranda’s small pig’s tail at the base of her tailbone. There is a topless contest 
that night and in a savage moment, much like The Hunchback of Notre Dame’s contest for the 
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Pope of Fools, Olympia is unwantedly pulled onto the stage and her bestial body is exposed (18-
21). In his second section of Torture, “The Spectacle of The Scaffold,” Foucault argues that the 
public execution needs to be “spectacular” and “seen by all almost as its triumph” (34) to be 
successful in its purpose, that being to scare off or warn the public of committing crimes. The 
stage creates a space where Olympia’s deformed body can become spectacular, as it is presented 
as a unique object worth viewing, rather than a disability that should not be identified: 
The college girl, dumbfounded, is still pumping away with her mouth open, her knees and 
arms still following an old order to dance, as her mind is pummeled by what I am, and what 
they have done to me, and wondering if I am in on it…How proud I am, dancing in the air 
full of eyes rubbing at me uncovered, unable to look away because of what I am. Those 
poor hoptoads behind me are silent. I’ve conquered them. They thought to use and shame 
me but I win out by nature, because a true freak cannot be made. A true freak must be born. 
(20) 
Dunn allows Olympia this one triumphant moment where she can safely be proud of her body 
and re-materialize in the most indelicate of places, the stage of a strip club. The extremity of the 
indecency of the situation provides the spectacle that Foucault mentions. Not only is she on 
display, but she is naked and proud where many would think she never could be. Geek Love toys 
with the social delineations of space where the bestial body has power and where it does not. 
Within the audience she was nothing, unwanted, merely surviving in secrecy. On the stage, she is 
purposefully exposed and exuberant.  
Dunn’s freaks wish to gain control of this power, in their attempt to do so, they ultimately 
explore the same questions as Merleau Ponty on the issue of gaze; “We must attempt to 
understand how vision can come about from somewhere without thereby being locked within its 
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perspective” (69). Throughout the novel, the Binewskis have power when they are located in the 
carnival or the stage, but they are isolated once they move out of these spaces. Near the end of 
the novel, a reporter asks Olympia if she had the power to magically make her family “physically 
and mentally normal” (282) would she do it? She responds in the negative “That’s ridiculous! 
Each of us is unique. We are masterpieces. Why would I want us to change into assembly-line 
items? The only way you people can tell each other apart is by your clothes” (282). Here, Dunn 
creates two planes of human isolation. What Olympia says is true. The normal body can also feel 
alone amongst a sea of other normal bodies. In the moments that the freakish body is on the 
stage, it isn’t just powerful, it is also coveted. While the freakish body is isolated amongst the 
masses as a unique shape, normal bodies can also feel isolated amongst the crowd. Each body 
fights to either come in or out of focus, to be seen or go undisturbed.  
Merleau-Ponty readdresses the question of how gaze truly works and how humans access 
the world within the space of their vision. In the essay “Eye and Mind” Merleau-Ponty describes 
an existence where moving about and viewing objects does not ultimately prove to the subject 
that they are separate from the object. Instead, the act of seeing joins the subject to what is being 
seen. Here, the body, “because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. 
Things are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are incrusted in its flesh, they are part of its 
full definition: the world is made of the very stuff of the body” (125). If I were to invite an 
audience into this world view as the barker of a sideshow, I might describe the world beyond the 
tent to be just as relevant as vertebrae and neurons. All the objects of the world working together 
to house life and allow for being as skin covers the body and binds it together. That’s sensational 
billing, a suggestion offered to the audience that Olympia is trained to provide. But a such 
visceral description of the world would most likely enrage an expecting audience once they 
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would walk into the world beneath the sideshow tent and see that the world is still exactly as they 
know it, objects resting on other objects, and their own separate bodies moving amongst them, 
all cold strangers to each other. But if, the audience could understand the world as Merleau-
Ponty’s connected body, perhaps Olympia, her brother, and sisters would be more easily 
perceived as human and to the same extent of the audience members themselves. 
While freaks can have any number of variations from the average human body, Merleau-
Ponty describes a particular physical configuration in where the human body would no longer 
perceive like a human. This amounts to a forced reallocation of the eyes from the front of the 
face to the sides of the head “like certain animals…with no cross-blending of visual fields”. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that this type of configuration “…would not reflect itself; it would be an 
almost adamantine body, not really flesh, not really the body of a human being. There would be 
no humanity” (125). Humanity devoid, because the fish or horse-headed human would not be 
able to see their limbs, would not allow for shared lines of sight where the eyes join focus, and 
would not see a fully connected world. However, Merleau-Ponty doesn’t grant that a girl who is 
born with eyes on either side of her head ceases to be a human girl. The correct configuration of 
body parts clicking to place like Barbie and Ken dolls does not define the human. Instead, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that humanity exists in the space between “… the see-er and the visible, 
between touching and touched, between one eye and the other, between hand and hand a kind of 
crossover occurs, when the spark of the sensing/sensible is lit, when the fire starts to burn that 
will not cease until some accident befalls the body, undoing what no accident would have 
sufficed to do…” (Merleau-Ponty 125). In other words, humanity exists within an active 
perception of and connection to the world. This human interaction with the world does not 
merely take place between what Aristotle would conceive of as the space between the rational 
 
Hess 23  
soul and the body, with a synapse from the mind to the limbs. Rather, humanity exists between 
the viewer and the viewed, and spontaneously between all pieces that make up the body, cells, 
tendon, bone, hair in association with space and other objects. For Merleau-Ponty, humanity is 
movement toward the calling from the worldly body that makes up all things. 
The freaks in Dunn’s novel do not just include the born freaks of the Binewski family. 
Dunn also incorporates freaks that are created through a warped kind of medicine, people who 
chose to become amputees in order to feel less isolated amongst the masses of normal bodies. 
Arturo creates his first cult follower by catching ahold of her fear, the same sense of isolation of 
being a normal body amongst other normal bodies. She is an obese woman, and Arturo asks her 
if what she really wants is to be beautiful, to be loved, or to be “all right” (177-179). Arturo’s 
confidence in his freakish body is instantly attractive while he is in his tank, surrounded by an 
audience there to see only him. When he asks her again what it is she wants, she replies, “I want 
to be like you are!” (178). The Arturians find peace because they believe that by removing the 
body parts that made them fearful of judgment, and by giving up any hope of having a perfect 
body, all that will be left is peace. Without limbs they can’t do anything, but also don’t want to 
do anything or feel like they need to prove something. Their catch phrase becomes “Peace, 
Isolation, Purity” (227).  
The Arturians search for the disembodied experience that Katherine Hayles mentions has 
become a more popular with the rise of technological advancements. She notes that in both 
liberal humanism and cybernetics “Embodiment has been systematically downplayed or erased” 
(4). The Arturians are looking for an existence that will ultimately separate themselves from the 
psychological problems associated with the body, but ultimately, their real troubles are a sense of 
isolation inside their bodies. The Cartesian separation of body and mind and all other bodies is 
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what mistakenly holds them captive. In his introduction to Phenomenology of Perception Claude 
Lefort explains why Merleau Ponty’s work argues against this sense of isolation where humans 
often find themselves; “the body and its surroundings cannot be defined in isolation, if every 
attempt to describe the constitution of one presupposes a reference to the constitution of the 
other, and if every relation of cause to effect or means to end can only be determined in function 
of a certain given meaning of ‘configuration,’ then the classical distinction between the subject 
and the object is no longer viable” (23). The Arturians did not need to try and lose their physical 
bodies to find peace and community, rather, if they lived more like Dunn’s freaks, in glory of 
their bodies, in a community constructed by appreciating bodies, and in understanding of the 
embracing nature of the universe, they would have been fine. 
Dunn continues to play with the irreversible and the eternal by introducing freaks as 
preserved bodies of the once living or barely born. In the business of the carnival,  Mr. and Mrs. 
Binewski are frugal with their resources. Through the many attempts to create the perfect freak, 
the mother gives birth to six infants that were so deformed they did not survive. They are kept 
bottled and set on display like science experiments in “the Chute…six clear-glass twenty gallon 
jars…each lit by hidden yellow beams and equipped with its own explanatory, push-button voice 
tape” (52). It is the Binewski women’s task to tenderly clean the jars daily and to remember that 
the preserved children are still part of the family, to be loved and cared for as any of them (52-
55).  
Although shocking, Dunn’s Chute is a tribute to what used to be a common travelling 
show across America throughout the 1800-1900s. In his book, Secrets of the Sideshows, Joe 
Nickell has a chapter dedicated to what he calls “curios” (320) or preserved bodies. Preserved 
fetuses and infants were referred to as “pickled punks” (322) by carnies, and in later years the 
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specimens in these displays were often not real at all but made of rubber, in which case their 
name changed to “bouncers” (325). There was a hierarchy of value according to show managers, 
who would pay the most for the pickled punks that were born alive, the next highest for those 
that were real, and the least for the rubber bouncers, which would then also differ in levels of 
realism (322-326).  
The most horrifying aspect of Dunn’s Chute is not only that the fetuses are real or that 
two of them were born alive—one was named Apple and lived to the ripe age of two—but that 
the maternal mother is the one who keeps and displays them. While the death of a newborn is 
normally a private affair and display of the body would be sacrilege, the Binewskis believe that 
their unique bodies are the most important aspect of themselves, and by displaying their dead, 
they give them a chance to be fantastic, a wonder even in death. This act of preserving the dead 
became family tradition even before the jar children. After Olympia’s grandfather died, his last 
wish was to remain with the carnival forever, and her parents happily stuck his urn atop the 
generator truck as a shrine (7). While the children of the chute are greatly valued, they only exist 
together as part of the blow off--a freebie to view after the main shows. The Binewskis do share 
the same tendency as the 1800s show manager to rank their acts according to their proximity to 
life. The living are more valuable. Olympia remembers how her mother would repeat over and 
over, “We had such hopes for her” (54) to the jar child that would have been marketed as a 
Lizard girl, with a flat face and large tail.  
The patron’s experience of the Chute also forces the audience to think about the 
strangeness of birth and development of even normal bodies. Walking through the Chute’s dark 
tent itself evokes the image of birth—of coming out from the dark to the light, wide world. They 
pass by children in different forms of development, like a stages of conception poster where the 
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fetus must grow, split, combine, and enclose correctly, with infinite mistakes possible. While 
many pickled punks in American sideshows did contain deformed fetuses, normal looking 
fetuses were also an attraction, as the normal developmental stages of the fetus do look alien or 
amphibian, as the fishy groupings of cells bulge and grow limbs. The Binewski family display is 
even stranger as all of their potential children, like the Lizard girl, also show the potential for 
freakishness. One with two heads, another with no bones, and one that is not even self-contained. 
This one the children secretly call “the Tray” and Olympia describes it as “a lasagna pan full of 
exposed organs with a monkey head attached” (54). Within the Chute, the freaks seem even less 
human because they are still, inanimate objects. It is more of a museum than a show, where the 
jars are to be studied, closely. The jar itself, though transparent, creates a contained space and 
more visible separation between the observer and subject. Here, the audience is meant to fear the 
simple possibility of creating one of these monsters themselves as they look at the two-headed 
baby, or the Tray, or they can view the normal development of the body, and see how it is just as 
freakish, for a time. 
Apple, the jar child who lived until she was two, seemed to have little physical deformity 
other than lazy eyes. She was almost completely unresponsive to stimuli however, and most 
likely had a severe cognitive disability. As an almost normal looking child, she had no place in 
the family sideshow. Olympia mentions her death nonchalantly, in a blameless, practiced way: 
“A pillow fell on her face” (54). Although there is some mystery to Apple’s death, which is 
almost a family folklore, it is clear that Dunn’s characters are ready to murder their children if 
they are not born to the freakish standards of their parents. Apple was more valuable to Mr. and 
Mrs. Binewski as a pickled punk than as a daughter. While Mrs. Binewski may have condoned 
the murder, she is still, eerily, a caring mother to her jar children. Once made a freakish curiosity 
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through preservation, Apple can safely reside at the carnival. By creating an extreme distortion 
between the mother’s role of protector and executioner, Dunn shows how the space of the 
carnival can be just as dangerous to average bodies as the outside world can be to the bestial. 
There is a point where Olympia, in her early teens, upset that her secret crush did not 
return her love, imagines herself dead and that her family would cremate her and set her urn next 
to her grandfather’s in tribute to her memory, but the thought is discarded after she imagines 
them preserving her “in the Chute in the biggest jar of all and I’d float naked in formaldehyde 
and the twins would bicker over who had to shine my jar” (172). Small, white, and 
underdeveloped, Olympia does look like the pickled punks without the glass around her. To be 
placed there would mean she was a failure, like the others, who had so much potential—we had 
such hopes for her—but ultimately could not survive. 
In the novel the grotesque descriptions of bodies paired with the extreme behavior of the 
Binewski family’s flipped value system that prefers the freakish body over the norm, highlights 
and underscores the inhumane systems in place that subjugate freakish bodies to specific, 
confined spaces. To regulate the populace’s discomfort at running into a freak on the street, the 
hospital, television, freak show stage, and museum have become the only spaces where freakish 
bodies can materialize completely and live safely in the physical realm. Otherwise, they are 
forced to dematerialize, and in accordance with social etiquette, the observer ignores their 
existence. “Not staring” becomes a denial of existence and a reflexive motion toward the all but 
disappearance of the freakish body in popular society. Dunn has layered her novel with freaks 
who are the Binewski family’s conscious experiments. They are developed, born, and created 
using modern technology and medicine. While many critics have considered her extreme 
treatment of the body to be grotesque, in actuality, she touches on the many ways that the human 
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body is increasingly transformed by our technologies and forces us to understand our bodies in 
conjunction with objects, animals, and the physical spaces through which we wander. 
Surgical bodies also maintain spaces that are isolated from normal society. Like the 
physical freak that may have a genetic disease, the patient of surgery undergoes a grace period 
where they are treated as breakable objects. The leg cast, neck cone, and sling are all visual 
indicators that a person is not their normal self and should be treated much like an invalid. 
Staring at a person’s shaved head and scar after brain surgery is disrespectful in the same vein as 
staring at a bestial body. The difference between the surgical body and the bestial is that the 
surgical body will heal, and they can return to normal society once again. However, in Dunn’s 
novel, surgery is always irreversible. It leaves its mark on the body, takes away pieces of it, and 
adds new pieces that are essential for the body to continue to exist. 
After the shooting in the store parking lot, the shooter is sent to a mental hospital and 
eventually returns to his house, shoots his wife with a shotgun and turns the gun on himself (215-
217). But he doesn’t die. Instead, modern medicine somehow saves him. As a result, he becomes 
an awkward contraption. With most of his face gone, his is half tubes and bags of liquid powered 
by a squeezable air pump. In public, he wears a covering over his horrible face and is forever 
after called “the Bag Man” (217). The Bag Man is a freak both because his physical body is 
mangled and altered forever after his many surgeries, and because he is a visible failure of death. 
The lingering feeling of death surrounds him as his IV-like bags dangle in place of his face. He is 
a walking hospice, only alive with the help of machines that are now part of his body. The Bag 
Man is the human cyborg, part man, part tube and machinery. In What is Posthuamnism? Wolfe 
notes that critics must transform their understanding of the human from the mind to include the 
ways in which the body and the artificial parts of the body “‘bring forth a world’” and speaks to 
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“the evolutionary history and behavioral and psychological repertoire of the human itself” (25). 
Dunn’s character, the Bag Man, exhibits the next step in human evolution, surpassing the 
historical animal-human relationship toward what will ultimately be the human descendent, the 
immortal, the cyborg. His prosthetic body defies the old world of blood and flesh, and “brings 
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The Bestial Body/Cyborg/Enhanced Body 
Sideshow acts require exaggerated contrast; the World’s Tallest Man holds the World’s 
Smallest Woman in the palm of his hand; the Bearded Lady is demure and masculine; the 
Skeleton Man dines beside the Seven-Hundred Pound Woman. These bally sideshow 
advertisements emphasize differences between what is considered average size, animal 
characteristics, gender identification of human body and its representation in a freak show. 
During the heyday of the sideshow in the eighteen-hundreds through the early twentieth century, 
curiosities were often billed as human-animal hybrids: the crab people, the dog-faced boy, the 
leopard boys (Hartzman 1-60). Bally lines were a tease. They did not reveal the freak; instead, 
they created him. The outside caller gathered crowds to the tent by promising his audience an 
ordinary subject that looked, astonishingly, like something else. Misshapen bodies were further 
exaggerated by the caller’s suggestions, making audiences see similarities between the people on 
the stage and animals and objects—anything non-human. 
Cary Wolfe’s introduction to What is Posthumanism? notes that humanist definitions of 
the human identity depend on whether humanity is “achieved by escaping or repressing not just 
its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by 
transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether” (xv). Status as human is 
always conceived in opposition to the animal and is divorced further from plants, objects, and the 
natural world. As humans evolve and lose more animal characteristics, humanist thinking 
contends that we grow closer to reaching an ideal humanity. Posthumanism is interested in the 
human estrangement from the animal, the object, and the natural world. It calls for a focus on not 
only the growing differences between the human and animal, but also the apparent similarities. 
Posthuman thinkers like Giorgio Agamben and Donna Harroway invest in analyzing how human 
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identity and perception changes as we sway between the animal and the machine. The human-
animal hybrid and the cyborg as portrayed in Katherine Dunn’s Geek Love serve as a study in 
reclaiming the value of the animal as an enhancement to the human form, moving toward 
transhumanism. Her novel also shows that highlighting the dynamic layers of the world through 
which the freakish body lives reveals that the human identity is more of an uncomfortable, 
twisting amalgam than a definite category, touching up against and pushing away from vestiges 
of the animal, desperately toward the machine. 
The freak show family in Geek Love believe that their unusual bodies make them 
superhuman. They hold power and prowess over the norms who fill their audience. For the 
Binewskis, human life is pointless without a unique talent, form, or act. To be hopelessly 
noticeable is not a curse for the carnival-owning family, who dabbles in a dangerous kind of 
eugenics to create their freakish children. Mr. Binewski regularly thrills his children in 
describing their creation. Referring to them as his “Rose Garden” Al’s description harks back to 
early genetic experimentation, much like cross-pollination and Mendel’s peas (9). At other times, 
he refers to the children as his “dreamlets” (1) as if he is able to create his freakish children with 
only his mind rather than the very real, experimental regimen of drugs and toxic serums he feeds 
to his pregnant and willing wife. The idea came to him while looking at an actual garden, “It was 
a test garden, and the colors were…designed. Striped and layered. One color inside the petal and 
another color outside’…the roses started him thinking, how the oddity of them was beautiful and 
how that oddity was contrived to give them value…he realized that children could be designed” 
(9-10). Al Binewski immediately jumps from enjoying the peculiarity of engineered flowers to 
the human body. He sees little difference in his choice of medium for his experimentation. He 
does not question that his experience of moving from the sight of the unusual to awe will change 
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once the experiment is human form. Instead, the particularity of the object makes it glorious, and 
this is the same philosophy that he shares with his children and the world of between beauty and 
normalcy that he generates for them. By the time Dunn’s novel takes place in the 1990s, Al has 
noticed the mental shift of the masses away from the animal and so conjures the freakish human 
body, which proudly exposes its hybridity to become maybe further from human but closer to 
beautiful. Al’s actions and philosophy of beauty disagree with the humanist categorization of 
perfection. Rather than viewing human evolution as an ever-growing ladder away from the rest 
of the world, Al views evolution as a mutation that takes place deep within it, sprouting legs and 
tails that place the being in between previously designated species. 
In his chapter “Mysterium disiunctionis” from The Open, Agamben makes it clear that 
humans have an obsession with defining life and differentiating themselves from other living 
plants and animals. This realization is important in the context of posthumanism, which seeks to 
understand how humans change as they relate to other living and non-living beings. The trend is 
that humans feel the need to formulate a break between ourselves and animals. This break has 
traditionally been agreed upon by philosophers of the past. After all, we are the only ones who 
seem to be doing mental work beyond the basics of survival. Humans, Agamben argues, have 
logos, or an ability for thought that his beyond that of animals, a distinction that has been taken 
for granted for quite some time. However, he notes that the human need to separate the self from 
the animal deserves increased attention; he wonders, “if the caesura between the human and the 
animal passes first of all within man, then it is the very question of man—and of ‘humanism’—
that we must be posed in a new way” (16). Thus, while many philosophers have assumed that 
man is made of a duality of natural, animalistic instinct and something more rational, Agamben 
recognizes that this way of thinking means that humanity is differentiated by this internal 
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confrontation. We are perplexed as our animal and human natures oppose one another, but other 
animals and objects don’t have this concern. The fact that humans do recognize a conflict of 
identity may be a distinction from animals in itself. From the distinction emerges a new human 
identity, “We must learn to think of man as what results from the incongruity of these two 
elements, and investigate not the metaphysical mystery of conjunction, but rather the practical 
and political mystery of separation. What is man if he is always the place—and, at the same time, 
the result—of ceaseless divisions and caesurae” (16). This ongoing conflict between the animal 
and the logical aspects of human identity is a focal point from which posthuman thinkers can 
investigate the impact of the animal on the human rather than resolving to forget it as a long, lost 
artifact of evolution.  
Dunn’s novel presents a new, engineered kind of human being that accepts these 
divisions Agamben mentions. As the Binewski family lean to the left of this evolutionary battle 
and tease out the animal/logical conflict within their sideshow acts. Arturo, in particular, is 
presented as a master manipulator of both his family and his fans. Even though he is the least 
mobile of the bunch—he crawls like an inch worm or uses a wheelchair—Olympia differentiates 
her Siamese twin sisters and Arty by the effect of their performances, where “Electra and 
Iphigenia were high-powered performers, they wrung your heart, cramped your brain, brought 
silence on thousands for half an hour at a time. And the crowds that watched Arturo were 
funneled out of themselves, pumped into the reservoir of his will” (17). While Ellie and Iphy’s 
body is a transhuman creation that awes audiences with their beauty, skill, and sexual potential. 
Olympia describes their piano skills as if they are geniuses, “Their compositions for four hands 
were thought by some to have revolutionized the twelve-tone scale” (8).   
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 Arty’s body allows him to control his audience by presenting a hidden fear—that they 
may also be, in some way, bestial. He forces his audience to remember the divisions that exist 
inside themselves and he accentuates it by moving like an animal as he swims through his tank 
and contrasting that with intelligent conversation. Olympia herself, in awe of Arty’s strength and 
intellect, remembers that he “always talked to people. It was a central charm of his act that, 
though he looked and acted alien, part animal, part myth, he would prop his chin on the lip of the 
tank to talk ‘just like folks” (Dunn 49). As Arty’s act gains popularity, the members of his 
audience become active in an experiment of the imagination, where they too, can change their 
bodies to gain particularity. Arty’s strength and confidence in his show forces the audience to not 
only question the value of human limbs to stand upright and the thumbs to hold objects, it helps 
them imagine the possibility of happiness and power that can be gained by having a misshapen 
human body. 
Thomas Nagel also breaks from the traditional understanding of the human as a mind 
separated from the body in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” as he attempts to further understand 
the relation between the mind and the body by thinking in an inherently different way than that 
of past philosophers. Why not, like a bat? The practice becomes difficult immediately as he 
“cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining some 
combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications” (3). Ultimately, humans can only 
imagine the experience of other creatures as an extension of their own bodily perception. We are 
unable to actually know what the real experience might be of a species unlike ourselves, or of 
another being with different methods for perception. Nagel describes how the task is impossible 
now, but he optimistically calls the individual human experience “a challenge to form new 
concepts and devise a new method—an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or 
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imagination” (6). Thus, Nagel is frustrated with the human tendency to reduce the experience of 
animals and other beings inherently different from humans to simplified explanations. Scientific 
observations may state fact of what tasks certain animals can accomplish, or they can predict 
where animals will migrate, how they may move, but we still equate expressions and actions to 
base human characteristics. Many people assume their cat is happy when it purrs, while scientists 
have found multiple reasons why a cat may purr, including discomfort or fear. The fact is, we 
don’t know exactly what a cat may be feeling.  
This redirected thinking that Nagel introduces works well in analysis of the freaks in 
Dunn’s novel attempt to change the way their audiences think about other species. Although 
attending Arty or the Iphy and Elly’s shows do not give the audience an objective view into the 
experience of the Other, they do the first step of work by forcing the audience to imagine what it 
would be like to have deformities, to embrace the bestial. As Arty swims in his tank like a seal, 
“flashing wildly from glass wall to glass wall with the lights flaming on his gleaming body…” he 
reminds the audience of his humanity, “talking to people through the microphones set against the 
glass. Talking until they people talked back, talking until they cried for him, talking until they 
called out his name…” (206). Arty becomes a creature who is something more than human. He is 
a reimagining of the human body, removed of limbs, enhanced with the flippers of a seal. His 
human voice breaks open the sectors of experience to include both the human and the animal in 
one body. Likewise, Elly and Iphy are Siamese twins, two minds in one body. They intrigue their 
audiences with their cooperation, and perplex them with their disunity. One body with opposing 
interests and separate powers of control enhance Nagel’s challenge to find a method to 
understand objective experience of the Other. The Siamese twins reveal the conflict between 
mind and brain as two minds contend inside one body. As they grow older, Iphy and Elly 
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disagree on the way to make use of their body as Elly is interested in profiting from sex, and 
Iphy would rather keep her body inside the freakish family and marry Arty (203-204).   
Like Nagel, Agamben also describes exercises that ask a human subject to view the world 
as another species, a “hedgehog, a bee, a fly, or a dog” to enact an “experiment [that] is useful 
for the disorienting effect it produces in the reader, who is suddenly obliged to look at the most 
familiar places with non-human eyes” (45). These imaginative exercises allow the human to 
begin to detach from a particular human identity, wholly separate from other beings. However, 
Arty’s act is interesting because it exaggerates the animal aspect of the human and surprises an 
audience who is used to viewing oddities without personal interaction.  
Agamben uses examples from a zoologist’s descriptions of different types of animals to 
illustrate how animals relate to the world in ways that are difficult for humans to understand. His 
thought experiment asks the reader to imagine themselves as a tick. The human imagination 
immediately dives into the possibly sounds, sights, and smells that a tick might greet in nature 
“immersed in the sunlight and surrounded on all sides by the colors and smells of 
wildflowers…” but, the zoologist notes that the tick’s body does not allow for any of these 
perceptions that would derive from human imagination of a new experience. Every example of 
how we might assume a tick would feel comes down to perceptions that it does not have, “one 
might reasonably expect that the tick loves the taste of the blood, or that she at least possesses a 
sense to perceive its flavor. But it is not so” (46). While the tick cannot participate in sensory 
observations in the same we that humans do, Agamben makes an interesting conclusion, that the 
tick actually participates in a “passionate relationship the likes of which we might never find in 
the relations that bind man to his apparently much richer world. The tick is this relationship; she 
lives only in it and for it” (47). How can this be so? The tick is only able to perceive the function 
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that she is meant to live for and that allows her to live—to drink blood. In a similar way, the 
Binewski freaks live—are born even—for interactions with an audience. They are able to survive 
because of the income from their shows as well and Olympia mentions multiple times how her 
family tends to give Binewski babies away that look too human. Olympia herself, understands 
that she was close to being abandoned if it were not for her strong voice, that could be used to 
attract audiences to her more talented sibling’s shows (8).   
Even long after the sideshows, after almost all of her family are gone and Olympia is 
successful on her own, she does not lose the wish to be even more special, to be have even 
further differentiation from the norm. As her daughter, Miranda, confides to Olympia that she is 
struggling with the decision to rid herself of her one physical deformity—her tail—Olympia 
surprises Miranda with her reaction to her question: 
‘What I’m asking is, am I crazy to have this liking for my tail?...You must have 
wished a million times to be normal.’ 
   ‘No.’ 
   ‘No?’ 
‘I’ve wished I had two heads. Or that I was invisible. I’ve wished for a fish’s tail 
instead of legs. I’ve wished to be more special.' (Dunn 34)  
Later in the novel, even once Olympia no longer relies on her freakishness for survival and there 
are no more shows or audiences, she still longs for her body to have power of the particular over 
the average human. She wants her body to act as a tool to allow her to climb an invisible division 
between the norm and over to the fantastic from which she was raised.  
Olympia and her siblings were raised to use their bodies to work for a living. From the 
time they were babies, they were the head liners of the family Fabulon. They are hyper aware of 
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what their bodies can do for them and how to use them to aid in survival. In The Use of Bodies 
Agamben opens his chapter, “The Animate Instrument and Technology” with a discussion on 
Heidegger and equipment. For Heidegger, tools have value in what they can do. However, a tool 
can have multiple functions with multiple levels of significance. Agamben uses peasant’s shoes 
as an example. Compared to other common tools and utensils, “to the peasant shoes there 
belongs the magical power, for the person—or to the woman, since it is a question of a peasant 
woman—who uses them, of disclosing her world, conferring meaning and security on it” (66-
67). Shoes in themselves are valuable to help us walk without hurting our feet, but for the 
peasant, shoes become even more significant, as they arise as a crucial tool, a thing of delicacy 
and grace. Shoes become more valuable to the peasant than many of other tools that an average 
person may take for granted. The peasant has less, and therefore places greater value on their 
tools, and especially those that ease pain. Hence, the Binewskis are aware that their freakish 
bodies are tools, but they too, transcend instrumentality, because they also find their unique 
physical traits beautiful. The Binewski children cannot be mass produced, instead, they are 
loosely engineered. They are experiments, and Al Binewski’s method seems to be trial and error. 
He does not try to recreate a prior success. Instead, he only attempts to replicate and increase the 
degree by which his creations divert even farther from the norm. This distance, being human and 
yet still differentiated from average form creates an oddity, which can be appreciated as beauty. 
Agamben’s further exploration of the idea of the human as an instrument is particularly 
important for EXPLAIN FURTHER as he deciphers Heidegger. He describes how equipment, 
“opens to the human beings its world” and at the same time, human beings rely on equipment’s, 
“‘serviceability,’ and only by means of it do they enter into their world. In this sense, the relation 
with equipment defines the human dimension.” (68). Agamben’s analysis of Heidegger asks to 
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search for a point when the human being truly interacts with the world. Do human beings break 
free from mere serviceability? Agamben and Heidegger attempt to prove that humans do 
transcend an existence focused on survival toward one that encounters beauty and is beautiful. 
Dunn’s freaks to the audience are like shoes to a peasant. They are scarce, yet crucial for 
understanding and being a part of the full world, which includes hybridity, mutation, and 
engineered creations. Beauty is in the strange, the bold, the unexpected, for Dunn’s freak show 
family. 
Dunn’s novel intensifies the distortion of the beautiful, purposeful life. While the 
Binewski children’s bodies make them appear bestial, they also embrace the contradiction of the 
internal animal/logical duality. They believe that their unique bodies are closer to works of art 
than the average shaped humans who attend their shows. Even though it is the children’s bodies 
that act as their tools for their survival, the sideshow becomes the world in which their bodies 
relate, where they make sense, and where they thrive. Their bodies also create the freak show 
and power the business that is the Binewski Fabulon. The freakish body as equipment in Geek 
Love takes an unexpected route from mere livelihood to a stage of truth, where the freaks can 
prove that the grotesque is the beautiful; their bodies and lives are works of higher art.  
Although Olympia and her siblings appreciate and love the particularity that their bodies 
give them and use it as a productive tool for their survival, they still are not safe from living an 
enslaved life. In The Use of Bodies, Agamben moves his focus from equipment to technology 
which is “nothing other than a human action directed at a goal” (68). Therefore, technology is a 
movement, an expense of human energy to solve problems. The issue is whether or not 
technology is an action that will help the conflicted human appreciate the beautiful life—to both 
appreciate the world and technology itself, he argues, does not lead to freedom: “slavery is to 
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ancient humanity what technology is to modern humanity: both, as bare life, watch over the 
threshold that allows access to the truly human condition (and both have shown themselves to be 
inadequate to the task, the modern way revealing itself in the end to be no less dehumanizing 
than the ancient)” (Agamben 78). Slavery involves an inability to interact freely with the natural 
world. While the Binewski family appreciates their bodies, they rarely leave the freak show. 
They choose to remain in a version of the world that seems adequate to accept and protect them, 
rather than enter the wider world where they would find openings to new experiences beyond 
their instrumentality and their placement on the stage.  
Posthumanism seeks to re-analyze the human connection to the animal as well as the 
human interest in and relation to technology, “The slave is, on the one hand, a human animal (or 
animal-human) and, on the other hand and to the same extent, a living instrument (or an 
instrument-human)” (78). Here, Agamben adds yet another layer to the conflicted human being 
beyond the animal/logical conflict, insofar as the human “relationship with nature is no longer 
mediated by another human being but by an apparatus, human beings have estranged themselves 
from the animal and from the organic in order to draw near to the instrument and the inorganic to 
the point of almost identifying with it (the human-machine)” (79). The final important 
connection and third identity that butts against the human identity in Dunn’s novel is the 
category of the cyborg. While the human-machine introduces yet another conflict in the human 
identity along similar lines as the animal-human, modern society has widely embraced 
technology to fix, enhance, and change the makeup of the human body. From cellular devices 
manufactured to increase the ease for communication and access to information to medical 
advancements, technology is constantly interacting with the human body. Donna Harroway calls 
the twentieth-century, “a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of 
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machine and organism” (150). The digital tools we use daily become a part of our consciousness 
and our body, as the smartphone has become a crucial piece of the human body. When missing, 
bodies that are used to having access to the mobile phone as a tool to perceive information have a 
similar reaction to a phantom limb. Although, Merleau-Ponty writing in the 1900s would not 
have known about modern technology, his observations on the phantom limb are important here.  
Harroway’s thinking on the concept of the body is very much in the tradition of Merleau-
Ponty and Agamben as she considers the conflict between machine/human. She argues for 
humans to move on from traditional ways of thinking about the mind-body problem and allow 
themselves to feel “pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their 
construction” (150). Harroway believes that the cyborg generation will evolve to accept the 
inherent divisions within human identity and erase the notion that there is one natural, human 
identity that is distinct from the animal and the machine (150). She does this by using modern 
technology as a mode to further her argument, ultimately, feminist call for economic equality. 
She re-envisions the structure of the human body with cybernetic principles, “It can even be 
argued that biology has ceased to exist and that the organism has been replaced by cybernetic 
systems” (57).  Harroway asks her readers to view the body as a complex relation of systems 
rather than the more straightforward biological description of muscle, bone, and tissue. As future 
generations learn the benefits of creating hybrid beings, made of flesh and metal, thinking with 
both the mind and the computer, the definition of human identity will change. Accepting the 
cyborg moves humanity closer to appreciating and accepting divergent bodily forms as well, in 
other words, as technology assimilates as a crucial extension to the natural body, humanity will 
come closer to understanding the what it is like to be a freak. Accepting the inherent divisions of 
the human identity: the logical, the animal, and the machine, is an acceptance of the freak. 
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Accepting the cyborg as a part, or even, the future of humanity forces us to question 
which aspects of the machine mind are useful and which may be dangerous. An uncountable 
number of science fiction novels and films warn that the programmed mind may distrust ethics in 
lieu of a more logical and structured world, often without human spontaneity. Harroway notes 
that in our time of intense, technological innovation, it is already difficult to tell the cyborg from 
the human. Where once it was impossible for a person to be truly tricked by the machine, “Now 
we are not so sure. Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the 
difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally 
designed…Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert” (152).  
Harroway’s description of modern technology portrays disturbed and fearful reactions to both 
modern machines and the people who live through them. This is reflective of the general distrust 
and confusion over which emotions and actions are inherently human and inherently machine. 
Interaction with machines decrease the necessity for humans to move and work and provide 
virtual space where the mind can play and interact with very little interaction from the body. 
Chatrooms, video games, and social media create external worlds that do not require much 
movement from the body other than mouse clicking, key typing, and button pushing. Even 
though this is not the world directly discussed in Dunn’s novel, they still depend on scientific 
discoveries of the modern era. Likewise, machines take on more active roles within the world 
automatically. Humans can decide on settings and let them run on their own, whether that’s 
cleaning our carpets, navigating directions, or paying our bills. While these machines enhance 
our lives, it is still shocking to realize when that our machines are almost as active in the world 
as we are. It is equally startling to find humans who are hermitic, emotionless, and logic-
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oriented. These robotic people are not cyborg physically, but emotionally. And this breed of 
technologic humans have the chance of proving science fiction to be true.  
A new danger threatens the Binewski children’s existence in their protected, freak show 
world. For most of their lives, Al Binewski has filled the role of both ringleader and father, as 
well as genetic engineer and nurse for any ailments that his family of employees encounter. As 
they grow older, Arturo gains power both over his audiences and his family and begins to make 
decisions for the family business. He hires a doctor to join their caravan. Al Binewski had always 
treated illnesses of his sideshow family and, “fancied himself a healer” (118), but Dr. Phyllis 
introduces modern medical technology to the show. Olympia and her sisters are instantly uneasy 
in the doctor’s presence, “‘I think she’s creepy,’” Ellie says (120). This statement is significant, 
coming from a girl who has two heads and often feeds tigers and lions from her hand. Doctor P is 
first described as the “white lady” as she completely covers her body “in white—the uniform, the 
shoes, stockings, gloves, and of course the snug cap and the face mask. Only her glasses were 
neutral, clear, the eyes behind them blurred by their thickness” (119). While it seems that the 
doctor may have a reason for her attire, attempting to hide some horrible scar or deformity, Dunn 
makes it clear that Doctor P. looks completely normal without her uniform. Instead, she chooses 
to hide herself and presents herself as an amorphous, white figure. She also lives, works, and stay 
almost exclusively in her laboratory trailer. When Arty tries to have Olympia get her to talk 
about herself, conversation is almost impossible. She rarely speaks but in “rigid orders…Her 
voice scratched out of the speaker” from her trailer (123). Dr. P. is obsessed with order and 
cleanliness as well, and forces Olympia to package and re-package something as in consequential 
as her trash like a paranoid program. She is the most inhuman of all the non-freaks in Dunn’s 
novel. She lives and thinks like a machine, even when it comes to her own body.  
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Years later, Olympia finds a news article that describes Dr. P.’s first major experiment, a 
“major abdominal surgery” that she performed on herself to remove what she thought was a 
bugging device, “implanted next to her liver by an unnamed undercover organization” during 
college (124). Arturo is impressed by her surgical prowess and passion for bodily 
experimentation. While Al Binewski focuses on the creation of what he would consider a natural 
freak, or own born freakish of flesh, it becomes clear that Dr. P. is only concerned with creating, 
adding, and cutting from natural bodies to serve an end—sometimes their own, and sometimes 
Arturo’s. The doctor herself does not seem to be so concerned with the final creation or with 
proving and medical theories, instead, she loves the process of surgery. She does not seem to rise 
above what Agamben considers instrumentality either in her purpose or personality.  
Dr. P.’s first creation for the Binewski Fabulon is the horse with no feet, a present Arty 
offers his twin sisters for their birthday. The horse could no longer walk on his damaged hooves, 
and Dr. P. replaced the horse’s feet with four “rubber-padded half-leg stumps” (142). In Dunn’s 
novel the horse represents the possibility for mechanical manipulation of the body. While Al and 
Lillian cheer on Dr. P.’s success at creating a new creature, and saving the horse from his painful 
disfigurements, Olympia and her sisters are wary of the horse’s happiness. It’s Elly who realizes 
what Arturo is looking to prove by bringing Dr. P. into their world; “‘So this is what it’s going to 
be like,’ she said. Her voice was as dry as the sand that stretched to the sad edge of the sky” 
(143). He wants is interested in improving his method of transportation and wishes to walk on 
his own, without humping across the ground or being pushed in his wheel chair. For the first 
time, he tests technology to see if it can help him gain more power than his freakish body already 
allows. In this moment, he hopes to gain the love of his sister, Iphy, but ultimately, it fails.   
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Even though Arturo never uses Dr. P.’s prosthetics to change his form, Dr. P. does 
ultimately creates a cyborg. While it has already been mentioned, it is important to clarify that a 
cyborg is not solely a machine, and are distinct from robots, designed to complete specific tasks 
that are sometimes built to look and act human. A cyborg is a human who has enhanced their 
body using technology to be able to complete certain tasks better than they could otherwise. This 
kind of body is of particular interest to posthumanism, because cyborgs further push against the 
limit of the human toward the object and push the object closer to being human. In her essay, “A 
Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” 
Donna Harroway employs the cyborg as an “ironic political” tool and defines it as “a cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction” (149). Rather than being purely machine, a cyborg is instead a human who participates 
in transhumanism through mechanical means. While it’s unclear whether or not having an 
implanted pacemaker is enough to call a person a cyborg, there is a legal precedent for that 
distinction. The cyborg poses an important question—when does a human change into something 
else with surgery, amputation, or prosthetics? 
Part one of this thesis recounts one of the most gruesome sections of Dunn’s novel, the 
shooting in the grocery store parking lot, where Oly, Elly, Iphy, and Arturo are attacked by a 
gunman. The shooter is sent to a mental hospital and eventually returns to his house, shoots his 
wife with a shotgun and turns the gun on himself (215-217). But he doesn’t die. Instead, modern 
medicine somehow saves him. As a result, he becomes an awkward contraption. With most of 
his face gone, his is half tubes and bags of liquid powered by a squeezable air pump. In public, 
he wears a covering over his horrible face and is forever after called “the Bag Man” (217). The 
Bag Man is a freak both because his physical body is mangled and altered forever after his many 
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surgeries, and because he is a visible failure of death. The lingering feeling of death surrounds 
him as his IV-like bags dangle in place of his face. He is a walking hospice, only alive with the 
help of machines that are now part of his body. The Bag Man is the human cyborg, part man, 
part tube and machinery. In What is Posthuamnism? Wolfe notes that critics must transform their 
understanding of the human from the mind to include the ways in which the body and the 
artificial parts of the body “‘bring forth a world’” and speaks to “the evolutionary history and 
behavioral and psychological repertoire of the human itself” (25). Dunn’s character, the Bag 
Man, exhibits the next step in human evolution, surpassing the historical animal-human 
relationship toward what will ultimately be the human descendent, the immortal, the cyborg. His 
prosthetic body defies the old world of blood and flesh, and “brings forth” a new definition of 
life, forever after carried forth by machines. 
While Dr. P.’s work seems like something only a futuristic machine could accomplish, 
real scientists have made comparable advances as they are learning how to control the genes that 
act as the overseeing engineers of body construction. Michael Levin is a scientist at Tufts 
University whose goal is to prove how “bioelectric signals surging through and among our cells 
act as an instruction to kick-start gene expression” (1). “In doing so, he has created a startling 
Island of Dr. Moreau zoo of freaks. He forced tadpoles to grow an eye on their gut, induced frogs 
to sprout six legs; and caused worms to grow two heads, which, when severed, will grow back 
just like a salamander’s severed tail—all by manipulating the faintest of bioelectric signals” (1). 
These kinds of experiments would not surprise Al Binewski. While Levin’s research ultimately 
focuses on discovery of how to enhance the human body with animal traits like that of a 
salamander, his focus is in creating organisms that can self-repair. Al’s experiments, although he 
does create salves and seems to be the doctor for his tribe of carnival workers (quote from book), 
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the majority of his experiments are unable to heal or extend the life of his subjects. Instead, his 
experiments ultimately harmed his wife, Lillian, as she is later cared for by Olympia in secret, 
disoriented and blind as she is. Rather than attempting to reactivate deadened limbs with metals 
objects, batteries like had been done in the past, Levin “is the first to precisely tweak bioelectric 
signals at the cellular level” meaning, he uses the natural machinery on which bodies are already 
built, rather than introducing foreign machinery (1).  
Experiments like Levin’s almost seem closer to wizardry than medical science. While 
Dunn’s Bagman and horse with prosthetic legs are miraculous, they still follow a semi-realistic 
narrative about modern technology. Arturo, Olympia, Iphy, and Elly are freaks, but believable as 
eugenic experiments. Throughout the book, Dunn stretches the human body in almost every 
possible direction, manipulating its form, and drawing the body into the bestial and mechanical 
aspects of human identity. The youngest Binewski child takes the human body a step further, 
beyond the power of advanced technology, into fantasy. Fortunado, or Chick, as his family calls 
him, does not look like a freak. In fact, Olympia remembers how her parents almost gave up the 
baby, who “had a close call in being born to apparent normalcy,” a death sentence for a Binewski 
child (8). On the very night they choose to leave him on a doorstep, Chick displays his true 
power—a combination of telekinesis and telepathy—the infant raises his mother into the air and 
pulls off her brassiere with his mind, eager for a last feeding. It’s not long before Al realizes 
“‘He’s a keeper, darling. He’s the finest thing we’ve done! He’s fantastic” (71). As he grows, Al 
is tempted to try many different acts for Chick, but it becomes clear that he is too powerful to 
display to the world, and is in constant danger of being taken by scientists interested in his 
powers. Chick has the ability to control objects with his mind, and throughout the novel, 
practices his art until he can also control the sensations and internal processes of other characters. 
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Because he is so in tune with the bodies of other people and animals, he is tortured by their pain, 
and focuses his mental powers on easing their suffering. Ultimately, Chick replaces Dr. P. as he 
is able to not only move large objects and people, but also molecules, atoms. He is able to focus 
on the interior of animal and human bodies. Dr. P. unknowingly gives him enough knowledge to 
take over her job. This is orchestrated by Arty, who wants Chick out of the spotlight and put to 
use. It was Chick who replaced general anesthesia for the horse with rotten feet: “She’s teaching 
him to be a pain killer…She told Chick about the pain dingus in the horse’s brain, drew pictures, 
and had him fool around inside until he figured out how it worked” (143).  
Dunn incorporates Chick as the next level freak—the human with powers even beyond 
that of the cyborg, an advanced form of being who can accept Nagel’s challenge to understand 
the experience of others and animals. By incorporating fantasy into her novel, Dunn succeeds in 
avoiding an obvious commentary on biology and technology alone. She surprises not on the 
reader, but the Binewskis as well with the introduction to Chick’s powers. Fantasy opens even 
more the field of manipulation of the human body. Dunn imagines the next step in human 
evolution. Her goal is to stretch out what the human body can be and do. Chick is the most 
empathetic character in the novel as he has the ability to feel the pain and joy of other beings, 
“…Chick himself had only one ambition and that was to help everybody so much that they 
would love him,” but he is also the most dangerous of the Binewski freaks (92). Although Arty 
was jealous of Chick, he predicts the end of the Fabulon and Binewski family as he yells, “Can’t 
anybody see but me what he [the Chick] is? What he’ll do to us? He’ll end up smashing this 
whole family like an egg if we’re not careful…” he’s “As innocent as an earthquake” (103). 
Chick’s power for empathy makes him the most human out of Dunn’s freaks, but he is still the 
ultimate cause of destruction. Introducing Chick into the freak show adds a level of abstraction 
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that asks the question: how extreme can the body differ in function and still be human? And asks 
this question afresh, rather than stopping at technology, the cyborg, who already walks within 
modern society. 
Artificial reproduction is an example of modern transhumanism as human beings move 
away from natural reproduction through modern techniques such as surrogacy, in-vitro, and even 
genetic selection. No longer, does the sperm and egg need to reside within the human body, 
instead, it is becoming normal to begin the reproductive process outside of the body itself. In 
both Olympia’s youth and her adulthood, she believes that her family is inherently better than the 
average human because of their exceptional bodies, but she distinguishes her family from self-
inflicted freaks; “Hunger artists, fat folks, giants, and dog acts come and go but real freaks never 
lose their appeal” (278). The cyborg then, may not impress Olympia as much as her own 
siblings, but the freakish body itself, recognizes the potential and the need for additional tools 
than the normal human body. 
Olympia believes that her genes contain a passionate connection to her siblings and a 
heritage of freaks. As she dances on the stage of the Glass House Club, she knows, “…I win out 
by nature, because a true freak cannot be made. A true freak must be born” (20). Even though 
her father created his children with genetic experimentation, Olympia has pride that they were all 
born to be unique, rather than having artificial alterations after birth. However, Olympia herself, 
conceives her own child without sexual contact. She uses a new form of in-vitro that incorporates 
Chick’s focused powers. Olympia asks him to impregnate her with his Arturo’s sperm after she 
has realized she is unlikely to find any other man to love; “‘Chicky, listen. Remember how you 
used to pick pockets? Well, you know the sperm in Arty’s balls?’ I had his attention at least. 
‘Could you move that sperm—the wiggly little things—could you move them into me and get 
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‘em into the egg thing in me so I could have a baby like Iphy’” (297)? Because Chick has 
already been able to complete hundreds of surgeries with only his mind, Dunn makes the fantasy 
of Chick’s powers feel like medicine. It’s not surprising that he is able to facilitate life with his 
mind as well. Chick’s ability to fertilize Olympia with their brother’s child tangles even further 
our understanding of ‘natural’ birth as opposed to an engineered human. Believing in Chick’s 
powers make it easy to believe that he would even have known which sperm and which egg to 
choose to create the most beautiful combination that would result in Miranda, the child whom 
Olympia loves so dearly.  
Dunn accomplishes pushing the human body beyond the traditional and modern 
convolutions of the animal, the natural, the logical, and the machine. Chick’s birth breaks into 
the realm of fantasy, the incomprehensible power of the human body to control the construction 
of other objects and beings without direct touch. Chick becomes much like Nagel’s example of 
the bat, with ability to perceive more using methods that are not accessible to humans or 
technology. And in doing so Dunn surprises the reader with additional questions about the 
human experience. Either Chick is superhuman, with enhanced ability for empathy and 
understanding, or, he is less human as his powers have already broken an inherently human trait 
Agamben and Harroway believe we must embrace—a perplexing, multilayered existence, 
interweaving the animal, the logical, and the machine. 
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Death and Identity: Probing the Extremes 
Freak shows are intriguing to audiences because they create a space where they are free 
to stare at objects of fear, disgust, and curiosity and wonder at the same time. Geek Love 
embraces this complexity of emotion and inter-personal relations that arise from freak shows. 
While the Binewski children were raised to believe that their unique bodies make them superior 
to people with average bodies, they are simultaneously aware that their audience comes and 
returns again because they remind the audience members of their own mortality. As a teenager, 
Arturo tells his sister Olympia that he reads horror novels because they help him create a better 
show for his audience. Arty explains that horror novels “‘are written by norms to scare norms. 
And do you know what the monsters and demons and rancid spirits are. Us, that’s what. You and 
me…These books teach me a lot. They don’t scare me because they’re about me” (46). Most of 
the Binewski children have a talent for taking advantage of the way their audiences react to the 
sight of their bodies, but Arturo is the strongest at understanding the underlying emotions that 
draw average people to him. While his sisters more often attempt to make people love them in 
spite of and for their freakish bodies, Arturo controls his audiences by making them need him, as 
an intermediary between life and death. 
The cult that develops around the fascination of Arturo’s flippered body, the Arturians, 
pushes the narrative to focus on a new level of understanding about the human body. The cult 
members are in awe of Arturo’s limbless body and how it is able to survive. The extreme 
manipulation of the human body no longer is limited to the freaks themselves as Dunn draws out 
the deep, dark fears and grievances that the average person feels about their own body. Within 
the stage of the freak show, the Binewski family and their audience ultimately confront death in 
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addition to curiosity and fear. Dunn employs multiple emotional entry points to death as she 
describes the extreme differentiation of the freakish body from the norm: disgust, change, and 
sacrifice. Dunn explores questions of humanity through created humans, freaks who were not 
meant to be alive without the extreme manipulation of the body during Al Binewski’s 
experiments. 
In his book On Disgust, Aurel Kolnai explores the connections that humans make to 
disgusting objects and how an encounter with a disgusting object can reveal more about how 
humans interact with the world. His observations about the emotion of disgust show how this 
reaction to unpleasant forms is connected to, and reminds humans of death. Kolnai engages in a 
posthuman conversation, a phenomenological investigation that he conducts in hopes to 
understand more about the human identity through pathways previously ignored. A freak always 
ignites some level of disgust as the viewer observes a body that seems unnatural, displaced, or 
bestial. Olympia feels the reaction of disgust daily as she hides in her goat wig, big sunglasses, 
and long coats (12-13). She learns as a child, that the shape of her body would be disturbing to 
the average person, “the mechanics of my life were not going to run on the physics that ruled the 
twins or Mama in her day…If I loved it wasn’t the same as Iphy’s love or the love of bouncy 
girls in the midway” (287). Olympia is aware that her form denies her many of the opportunities 
and relationships available to other women who may be considered beautiful, and that her mere 
presence ignites disgust rather than wonder as the Binewski philosophy predicts. But Kolnai 
describes the reaction of disgust as a more complex emotion that just a knee-jerk reaction to 
ugliness.  
Disgust, instead, can also repel humans by reminding our own bodies of death at seeing a 
living freakish body. Kolnai describes types bodies and objects that also have a “surplus of life 
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[and] may be either a matter of some more or less exaggerated aspect of a still existentially 
coherent individual life (a gross, undignified, as it were perspiring, steaming impulse of life), or 
the danse macabre of living matter occasioned by the coming to an end of a real existence as a 
personal being: decay, repulsion, and the secretion of substance” (72). Here, Kolnai understands 
disgust as a reaction to death as well as to life, to too much life, to an overbearing life, or to a 
show of life that welcomes its audience toward death. Arturo’s followers are first attracted by the 
same features that Olympia loves about her brother, his strength, confidence, and the way he is 
so wonderfully mobile in water, while he is forced to crawl, legless on land. Arturo’s freakish 
body in particular, is an example of how being quadriplegic—a condition that is considered one 
of the ultimate forms of the handicapped—can hoist him to a position of power. Even in his 
condition, Arturo is able to control hundreds of followers and he feign a serene demeanor. The 
way that Arturo’s act disgusts his audience and ultimately his followers, doesn’t just remind his 
audiences of a decaying body, with pieces missing, but one that is at peace in his decomposition.  
Kolnai’s description of “The disgusting object” reveals that sometimes it does “not hold 
before our eyes an hourglass but a distorting-mirror; it shows us not a skull in its dry eternity but 
rather precisely what no longer attaches to the skull and is still a matter of fluid decay” (78). 
While there are many things that can be disgusting, Kolnai recognizes that part of the fear of the 
disgusting object is that it makes clear the active decomposition of the mortal object and viewer. 
Arturo attempts to control such a reaction of disgust as his audiences view his performance. His 
goal is to change their recognition of the decomposition of his body to a recognition of his power 
over this decomposition. Ultimately his followers wish to live a peaceful dissipation, as they 
choose to relinquish control of and parts of their physical body—fingers, toes, legs, and arms—
to Arturo’s will. 
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While most of the novel is described from Olympia’s perspective, the activation of the 
Arturian cult calls for another narrator, an outsider who is not under Arty’s spell. Dunn includes 
private journal entries of Norval Sanderson, a reporter who is intent on writing about the 
Arturians and understanding why they are so willing to become quadruple amputees. Sanderson 
is a national reporter for a magazine called Now. Having written previously about “wars, treaties, 
executions, and inaugurations for two decades” he tries to understand Arturo’s philosophy and 
psychology as well and ultimately creates a small rivalry between Arturo and himself. Sanderson 
documents Arturo’s movement as well as the happenings within the cult. Arturo seems to believe 
that the Arturians listen to him because they fear their own normality. He tells Sanderson, “I get 
glimpses of the horror of normalcy. Each of these innocents on the street is engulfed by a terror 
of their own ordinariness. They would do anything to be unique” (223). Whether or not the 
Arturians hope to be in some way special, it is clear that they are discomforted in their pre-
Arturian, average lives and think that they can make their lives better by losing parts of their 
body. Sanderson describes the cult as a “quasi-religion cult making no representation of a god or 
gods, and having nothing to say about life after death. The cult represents itself as offering 
earthly sanctuary from the aggravations of life” (227). Even though Dunn preps the reader for 
disgusting aspects of the freakish body and violent actions taken against it in the first two 
hundred pages of the novel, the introduction to the Arturian cult expands the realm of the 
sideshow to the entire world. It opens the reach of the Binewski Fabulon by readdressing it as a 
safe haven for average people as well as the freak show family and their employees. Ultimately, 
Dunn addresses the question of humanity in relation to the human body, exposing how each body 
is game to become in some way freakish, and how everyone has what Kolnai calls an “intention 
towards death” (75). This intention goes further than the aging toward death. The trajectory 
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toward death is not just a physical decomposition. The mind also yearns for disintegration and 
distraction from life itself. 
The motto of the Arturians becomes “Peace, Isolation, Purity” and is quickly shortened to 
“P.I.P” (227). The cult ranks its members by the amount of time they remain loyal and rewards 
them with amputations and slave-like workers (227-228). Dr. P. is the over-worked surgeon, who 
quickly tires of merely amputating toes and fingers. Like a machine, she yearns for efficiency 
and would rather complete the amputations at once. She asks Sanderson, “Why wait?...Why itch 
in places you’ve no longer got? Cut once! Cut deep! Cut where it counts” (272)! Dr. P. makes it 
all too clear what the ultimate goal of the Arturians actually is—to find peace in death and 
relinquish of the body altogether. The example of the Arturian cult helps to truly describe a 
fundamental drive behind human disgust. Kolnai explains that disgusting things often have a 
“surplus of life that is here so pronounced we were to become caught, as it were, in a short-
circuit towards death, as if this intensified and concentrated life should have arisen out of an 
impatient longing for death, a desire to waste away, to over-spend the energy of life, a macabre 
debauchery of matter” (74). The freak is often a surplus of limbs, of angles, a distortion of form, 
size, and ultimately an active example of the malleable body, how it eventually will shrink and 
curls into its coffin. Even Olympia fears that her own freakishness will wear on her daughter 
Miranda should she tell her the truth about her heritage, “I can’t be sure what it would do to her 
to know her real mother. I imagine her bright spine cringing and slumping and staying that way. 
She makes a gallant orphan” (12). The fear of contamination through the mere sight of the 
freakish body, or a connection to it elicits fear of an expedited route toward death. 
The existence of freakish bodies prove that the templated, average-shaped living body is 
not stable. This unsettling thought leads to an acknowledgement of death even while viewing 
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life. Kolnai acknowledges that this “passing into death through the culmination of life has a 
character which is peculiarly distorted in comparison with simple dying or ceasing to exist. It is 
as if we acquire a fascination, as is often the case with disgusting objects, with a kind of vitality 
somehow conjured up within the framework of death” (74). Death actively changes the body, 
whether we pass from a heart attack or a car wreck there is movement, distortion and 
transformation happening to the body.  
It is an old cliché that we are always in the process of death, but the Arturians seek peace 
in this process. While humans normally do not want to acknowledge death, the awareness helps 
the coping process for Arty’s followers. A famous distinction made by Heidegger is that humans 
are do differentiate themselves because they are conscious of awaiting death, “And other things – 
animals, plants, stones and planets – are ‘temporal’ in precisely the same way. But what makes 
the temporality of human beings special, one might say, is that, as well as being in time in the 
way other things are in time, human beings are also conscious of time and take account of time” 
(Heidegger 155). Because humans understand that they will die, it may in some way prove their 
humanity over other beings in the world. But the freakish body forces a reoccurring 
acknowledgement of death as their bodies fight for survival, rather than a conscious 
understanding better kept in the back of the mind. What Dr. P. doesn’t understand is that it is the 
gradual loss of pieces of their body that is reassuring to the Arturians. They continue to make 
small choices, prescribed to them by rules of the cult, and take small steps toward death rather 
than sudden expiration. Kolnai and Dunn prove that the process of dying is disgusting, but also 
riveting. It is an experiment in the incredible number of transformations the human body can 
make—the sheer mass that can be lost and still be living. The reader wonders as the pages go on, 
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how much further Dunn will go until the Arturians disappear completely? And when peace is 
ultimately found?  
 While the Arturians choose a more obvious route toward death, the Binewski freaks also 
invoke recollections of death because their bodies are shaped in such ways that they look almost 
inhuman. To what extent do the Binewski children move closer to death as their bodies further 
stretch the human identity? Death, for the human, can be physical, but it can also be a shift in 
identity or an inconsistent understanding of the self-identification as human. The Binewskis 
regularly differentiate themselves from the masses by referring to freaks as “us” and others as 
“norms.” The children very rarely imagine continuing their family by marrying outsiders from 
their freak show, but more significantly, their first choice for companionship and propagation is 
usually within their own genetic line. Olympia decides to have her baby with her brother, 
Arturo’s sperm. Iphy imagines marrying Arty just as Oly does. And Arty seems intent on 
controlling and keeping his sisters away from other men entirely. Once Arty finds out that Oly is 
pregnant, his first reaction is to harm her and the baby because he thinks that the baby was 
fathered by an outsider. Oly wakes from a blow as Arty whacks her with a toilet plunger. He 
shouts to the rest of the family, “She’s stuffed. Knocked up. The stupid traitor” (303). He only 
forgives Olympia when he finds out that the baby is his own and allows her to carry it to term 
(307). Olympia and Arturo value their genes more than anything else and are trained by their 
parents that if a Binewski is born without freakish qualities, then they are better off dead. Each 
Binewski child understands, even through whispered stories about their parents, that they were 
chosen to live because of their deformities. Each of them has beat the threat of death and 
abandonment, as their parents made the choice to keep them over other Binewski experiments 
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who were not as lucky. Thus, the Binewski children reach toward life by virtue of their 
freakishness.   
Even though their freakish attributes gave them life, the freakish bodies exclude many 
human qualities required for social participation with the world outside of the freak show. The 
present tense sections of Dunn’s book display the struggle of the freak in public society as 
Olympia must to hide to survive in the open, human world. Their venture as children to the store 
where they are shot at by the Bag Man reminds the Binewski children that they do not belong in 
social arenas outside of the freak show. Ultimately, the Binewski children are genuinely in threat 
of death all of the time. Because of this condition, they accept a kind of social death. The ways in 
which the Binewski children engage in social death and approach the border of human identity 
present posthuman questions about how humanity is informed by death and how humans define 
themselves in light of their mortality. While Heidegger differentiates animals as having lesser 
access to the world because they aren’t conscious of their future death, by the very act of 
courting death, Dunn’s freaks make the distinction that they are not animal (116). The Binewski 
children prove themselves to be closer to human than animal as they actively try to survive the 
stressors of the social world.  
Posthumanism is responsible for the surge of interest in human identity in light of death 
and along the borders of human existence. In Ian Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology, he summarizes 
how the true posthuman thinker would see the world as he quotes Levi Bryant. Instead of 
understanding the human as a separate, focal point and redeemer of meaning, “a posthumanist 
ontology is one in which ‘humans are no longer monarchs of being, but are instead among 
beings, entangled in beings, and implicated in other beings’” (16-17). Thus, the Binewski 
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children attempt to separate themselves from the rest of the world and replace the humanist 
approach to understanding the world with one where the not-quite human is the creator of reality.  
From the Binewskis’ perspective, they create a world where their bodies surpass the norm 
in every way. Early on, Al and Lillian Binewski begin allowing even their failed experiments to 
perform. Their children don’t make it to term, or who survives only a few days after birth, are 
jarred and preserved to reside as side show residents permanently. The children refer to the tent 
that holds this display as “the Chute” and “The sign in the jar room was bolted to the wall and 
had its own spotlight… ‘HUMAN,’ it said, ‘BORN OF NORMAL PARENTS” (54). The fact 
that the horrifying forms in the jars were born human, gives them an exalted value over average 
human babies. While Dunn is attempting to disgust the reader by mentioning the chute she is 
giving the jarred children, in a way, extended death rights over average human corpses. Cary 
Wolfe considers thinkers like Derrida and Diamond as he delves into posthuman, ethical 
questions. He comes to realize that humans “ feel a strange kind of responsibility and debt [to the 
dead] that is unsettling because unanswerable” (94). Even though the children are dead, the 
Lillian Binewski knows they are valuable and deserve some of the glory that she is able to grant 
her other children. She can still make them visible, even those that died inside her womb. People 
pay to see them. They are allowed to be displayed in full view rather than be hidden away in 
coffins underground or compressed into an urn. Their bodies have the privilege of preservation 
and continue to awe audiences around the country.  
However, Dunn is not encouraging that we preserve our dead and send them on tours 
across the nation. The Binewski philosophy is tainted with an obsession with death and so is 
unabashed at this kind of display, but the children grow to fear the Chute as they grow to 
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understand what it really means. There is a moment when Olympia is so upset that she imagines 
her own death and how her family would react to it: 
I crawled into my cupboard and tried to swallow my tongue or hold my breath 
long enough to die. I hoped they might give me a half-pint urn and bolt me onto 
the hood of the generator truck behind Grandpa. 
Chick would come to rest his cheek on my cool metal when he was sad. Mama 
would polish me every morning before she went to the Chute and blink away tears 
remembering my sweet smile. Then it occurred to me that they might put me in 
the Chute in the biggest jar of all and I’d float naked in formaldehyde and the 
twins would bicker over who had to shine my jar. I gave up on dying and went 
over to blubbering into my blanket instead…(Dunn 172). 
Olympia cannot dwell on the fantasy of death, the hope of her family’s sorrow at her absence 
because she knows that in death she is perhaps more likely to be put on display. The Chute is an 
oddity within their own freakish family. While Lillian still cares for her dead children and places 
value on them because of their wonderfully deformed bodies, her living children are unnerved by 
their jarred siblings. There is an understanding that while the jars are treasured, they are also all 
seen as failure, a loss. Olympia cannot find solace in death because she can only succeed in 
being a true freak if she is alive. The live freak is inherently more valuable than a dummy or a 
preserved body, because the living freak proves that the human body can dwell, work, and 
prosper even when changed. Therefore, the disfigured body is miraculous when it is alive and 
moving, but it disappoints in some way as part of a failed theorem, or a miscalculation once 
dead.  
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As Arturo creates a cult-like religion based on his deformity and his interactions with the 
world as a limbless man, he reorganizes our understanding of power, strength, and health. He 
turns previous notions about the disabled on their head. The Arturians believe that reducing their 
bodies to an almost immobile state and actively expel human anatomical attributes—thumbs, 
hands, feet, legs, elbows, biceps. The Arturians relinquish their ability to actively enforce and 
change the world, and instead, find peace in being within it. The final phase of P.I.P, the removal 
of all four limbs, enacts to understand the world through the lens of alien phenomenology, where 
the Arturians search for a peaceful existence similar to household objects. Bogost searches as he 
meditates on the phenomenology of objects, to find whether things that cannot directly interact 
with us can be considered alive, “The alien might not be life, at all. As Bernhard Waldenfells 
observes, the alien is ‘the inaccessibility of a particular region of experience and sense’” (34). 
The Arturians seek to become part of the posthuman world by physically stripping themselves of 
their ability for humanist interpretation. They must lie flat, and soak the world in. Only after 
death do we become the quiet objects that can truly listen with the rest of the world.  
Dunn does not glorify the Arturians, instead, she presents them as failed posthumanists 
and alien phenomenologists. To understand their place in the world, they needed to transform 
physically rather than mentally. The Arturians enact Nagel’s thought experiment of “What it Is 
Like to Be a Bat” by transforming into the object they want to understand rather than considering 
its phenomenology. It is as if, instead of trying find peace as humans, they felt they could only 
do it as objects, by limiting their ability to experience the world, and floundering in it. Freaks, on 
the other hand, search for that connection to the world in light of their physical deformities. 
Dunn’s freaks value their unique bodies because they allow them to think differently than the 
norm. They are forced to create spaces of peace, to work for power, and are more likely to 
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achieve it because of their difference. However, in the case of Arturo, Dunn reveals how this 
aggressive method of living and the urge to maintain the freakish genes of the family line, 
ultimately endangers life.    
Dr. P.’s amputee horse with prosthetic legs was an experiment that ultimately allowed 
Chick and Dr. P. to perform the amputations for the Arturians, but it was also practice for 
another surgery Arturo had in mind. As mentioned in chapter two, the prosthetic-legged horse is 
a precursor in Dr. P’s experimentation to create a human cyborg and the creation of a cyborg 
itself is an attempt to defy death by replacing the vulnerable parts of the body. It is early in the 
novel and in the lives of the Binewski children that their eldest brother, Arturo, is already 
searching for ways to help them continue to survive, and to make use of the malleability of 
bodies to do so. However, this attempt at the creation of a cyborg also shows how Arturo has an 
intense awareness of death. Whether his ultimate goal was to become a cyborg, super human or 
not, the horse was the first time Arturo realized he could use the doctor to remove a part of the 
body that was unwanted, and retain life throughout the rest. Throughout the novel it is evident 
that Arty despises any member of the freak show or of the family who is a threat to his station as 
future manager of the show. The show, for Arty, includes a strict control over the internal and 
external relations of his family as well. Oly notices how Arty and Elly disagree, and by the time 
they are teenagers, despise each other. Where Iphy is happy to agree to anything Arty wants, Elly 
demands to have control over their body, which they already share with one another. Arty’s 
solution to maintain his power and control the twins is to attempt to rid their body of Elly. He 
asks Dr. P. as they planned the surgery, “What if I was willing to sacrifice one twin to keep the 
other?” (268) By attempting to remove Elly by a lobotomy, Dunn comments on the human 
inability to kill part of the self. The Binewskis are used to manipulating their own and other 
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bodies to achieve greater freaks. Arturo is able adjust his conception of Elly, from his sister to a 
parasite in order to ask Dr. P. to extract her. The lobotomy to Arturo, becomes a necessary 
procedure, an act of medical care, rather than attempted murder. 
Elly’s lobotomy and the aftereffects of this procedure pose posthuman questions about 
the borderline between life and death. How many inhuman characteristics (those of a high 
functioning animal, a cyborg, etc.) does a being have to before we can justify an execution? Must 
the being pose danger to a human being? Dunn provides an example where a character must 
make this decision when Arturo feels that Elly is dangerous to Iphy and the family as she 
masterminds their side performance—sleeping with men for money. Once Arturo finds out about 
their new trade, he assumes that Elly has started this business to sever his relationship with Iphy, 
“‘Iphy, tell me. Did she do it to keep you away from me?’” (244) and he decides to “get rid of 
the parasite,” meaning Elly, his sister (269). In What is Posthumanism Cary Wolfe describes 
several posthuman ideas that can help explain how we ought to judge Arturo for his decision to 
execute Elly. While deciding whether or not humans have a right to kill other species of the 
world, Wolfe points out that thinkers like Jacques Derrida have offered a new way to consider 
this question that asks the judge to consider the phenomenology of other species rather than their 
abilities. Rather than asking questions like: do these species have the ability to do things that we 
consider to be human? Wolfe offers up a question Derrida asks, namely “can they suffer?” (81). 
Wolfe notes that this question deal with whether the beings have the ability to do things we 
consider to be human vulnerability rather than power to do something. This is important because 
by asking whether something can feel pain or be hurt by human actions requires the human to 
take notice of commonalities between the human and these species, the “mortality that we share 
with nonhuman animals…lie at the core of ethics” (81). By deciding to rid Elly of her other half, 
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Arturo has to reimagine Elly as an inhuman animal, with a dangerous, parasitic relationship for 
Iphy.  
Wolfe notes that whether another being can suffer should force us to think more like 
Derrida and be aware of “‘our responsibilities and our obligations with respect to the living in 
general, and precisely to this fundamental compassion that, were we to take it seriously, would 
have to change even the very basis…of the philosophical problematic of the animal’” (82). 
While Arturo is forced to undergo an extreme manipulation of the conception of the human to 
order Elly’s execution, Dunn’s book provides examples that address how humans have an 
obligation to at least remember the suffering of other beings. A short scene where Norval 
Sanderson runs into Chick. Just a few pages before the lobotomy, Chick is seen “crushing 
ants…in the dust,” a common activity for a ten-year-old boy. Children gleefully kill ants, hunt 
down their tunnels and crush them with their shoes. However, because of Chick’s gift, he is able 
to hear and he does feel the pain of the ants under his feet. Sanderson quickly learns that Chick is 
killing the ants out of woeful frustration rather than joy. As Sanderson approaches him Chick 
stops and begins “wailing like his heart was boiling out through his ears” (263). The pressure of 
sedating all of the pain around Chick builds up a destructive urge, a cry of suffering and need 
that eases once life around him is either healed or dead. Geek Love makes the reader rethink the 
distinction between human and animal as Chick is confronted with the answer to Derrida’s 
question of, “do they suffer?” at every point of the day. He does feel the suffering of other 
humans and animals.  
Ultimately, Dunn’s scene illustrates that living this thought experiment may be too much, 
as Chick confesses to Sanderson, that he “tries ‘to be good and help but it seems like everything 
turns out wrong’ and he’s ‘no good to anybody and ends up hurting instead of helping people’” 
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(263). Chick finds that while his gift allows him to truly understand the experiences of others and 
animals, he is unable to handle being responsible for limiting the suffering of every living being 
he comes in contact with. By working with Dr. P. and the Arturians, Chick comes to realize that 
people seem to be happier when they cannot feel the pain of their surgeries or the emotional pain 
from interpersonal conflict. Chick tells Olympia that is “Seems like there are a lot of people 
hurting. Seems like I should put them to sleep” (243). Chick understands sleep, or death, as an 
existence without pain. However horrifying this may seem, Chick understands death as a way to 
give another person bodily respite forever, even in the cases when he can no longer focus on 
their pain in an attempt to sedate it. In The Gift of Death, Jacques Derrida explores how the 
conscious anticipation of death is an important ability that gives humans an obligation toward 
one another as well as a chance to free the self. The gift can be to one’s self as well as from God, 
to allow a person to truly accepts their self as a being with a right to peace, “only gathering in the 
preparation for death but when it is ready to receive death, giving it to itself even, in an 
acceptation that delivers it from the body, and at the same time delivers it from the demonic and 
the orgiastic. By means of the passage to death the soul accedes to its own freedom” (41). These 
investigations are very important to partake in the surge of exploration of human identity as 
posited by posthumanism. If humans share the mortal experience with all other living animals, 
plants, and objects of the world, then death itself may be the one connecting factor that somehow 
invites each of us to be responsible for each other and care about the well-being of others, no 
matter the difference in species, ability, or form.  
Dunn incorporates Chick, the Binewski baby with no physical deformities, into the novel 
to introduce the ultimate freak. He is the most freakish of all, but just because of the extreme 
power he holds, but because he can truly understand the experience of others. He is the most 
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alone even though he can hear the inner voices of the world—the thoughts of animals, audience 
members, and his own siblings. Dunn’s last chapter detailing the Binewski family of the past is 
called “All Fall Down” and the Binewski is ultimately stripped of the safety of the sideshow 
(316). Olympia and Chick find Lillian Binewski screaming from inside the twin’s trailer. Iphy 
has killed Elly after she had slowly gained enough strength to murder their monstrous child, the 
baby of the Bagman. As Iphy dies from Elly’s wounds Chick fills with not only their pain but his 
own as he yells “I can’t fix her” (318). He leaves the trailer with Olympia tailing him, running to 
tell their brother Arty of the tragedy, but ultimately, the shock and pain is too much for Chick 
and his mind blows up the main tent, the freak show, his father and brother, and then Chick 
explodes, too (318-319). The outcome is tragic, “Many died. Many burned…all the dark, gaping 
corpses, in their fiery ballet, flexed and tangled in the dreams of the finders” (319). By including 
this extraordinary tragedy, I am convinced that Dunn does not admit that even if humans had the 
ability to truly understand one another that the pain would be too much, that it would be easier to 
burn everything to the ground than deal with our responsibility toward one another. Instead, 
Dunn includes this tragedy to show that mortals have an inherent struggle to apply their 
responsibility to each other and the self in so little time. Derrida analyzes thinkers like Kant, 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Levinas, and Patočka, to try to understand how death impacts human 
identity during life. He comes up with an understanding of death as a concept that is able to 
explain Geek Love’s tragedy: 
What gives me my singularity, namely death and finitude, is precisely what makes 
me unequal to the infinite goodness of the gift, which is also the first appeal to 
responsibility. Guilt is inherent in responsibility because responsibility is always 
unequal to itself: one is never responsible enough. One is never responsible 
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enough because one is finite, but also because responsibility requires two 
contradictory movements. It requires one to respond to oneself and as 
irreplaceable singularity, to answer for what one does, says, gives; but it also 
requires that, being good and through goodness, one forget or efface the origin of 
what one gives. (Derrida 52) 
Here, Derrida explains that human mortality requires that humans be responsible for each other, 
but the fact that we are mortal also makes this impossible to do accurately. Because of this, 
humans are wracked with guilt at our inability to ease all suffering but are rewarded with our 
own death which can free us. A hundred pages before the explosion, young Olympia thinks 
considers death to be inherently straightforward, “I throw death aside. Death is not mysterious. 
We all understand death far too well and spend chunks of life resisting, ignoring, or explaining 
away that knowledge” (240-241). For her, the real mystery is how people build loving 
relationships during life. For Olympia, the real mystery is not death, but how we should live in a 
way that others will accept her freakish body as another member of human society that will allow 
her to share in the responsibility we have toward one another—love. 
The freak show creates an opening in the borderland between humanity and the alien 
world, where freakish bodies are accessible to the masses, and where the masses are accessible to 
the freak. Bogost as a philosopher, asks the reader to “write the speculative fictions of their 
processes, of their unit operations…Our job is to go where everyone has gone before, but where 
few have bothered to linger” (34). As Bogost asks the reader to consider the existence of objects, 
he is also asking us to consider what it would be like to have an existence that is closer to death. 
However, posthumanism asks us to consider how the death of the human by imaging an 
existence as an object doesn’t necessarily force us to lose anything. We cannot deny that the 
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human imagination is still human, no matter how hard we try. Instead, by allowing one’s self to 
explore alternate existences without worry of death, or a loss of identity, we can slowly expand 
our understanding of the human, it’s relation to other beings and objects, and be closer to truly 
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